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INTRODUCTION 
Federal judicial appointments represent one of the most critical inter-
sections of law and politics.  All three branches of government are impli-
cated in the federal appointment process: the President selects judicial 
nominees who must then seek confirmation from the Senate, and successful 
nominees go on to decide cases of great political import.  The origins of in-
terbranch conflicts over nominations date back to the foundational years of 
the country.  For instance, the Senate rejected President Washington’s Su-
preme Court nominee John Rutledge because of Rutledge’s opposition to 
the Jay Treaty, which was strongly supported in the Federalist-dominated 
Senate.1  Beginning in the early twentieth century, diversity nominations 
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have similarly encountered great political opposition.2  With the implemen-
tation of wide-scale initiatives to diversify the bench, the stakes of this ideo-
logical and partisan debate have grown exponentially. 
When President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, there were but eight 
women (1.4% of all federal court judges at that time), twenty African-
Americans (3.5%), and five Hispanics (0.9%) on the federal bench (includ-
ing both active and senior status judges).3  Believing that such imbalance 
jeopardized the integrity of the entire justice system,4 President Carter be-
came the first president to implement a far-reaching appointment strategy 
with diversity as its cornerstone.5  By the end of his term, President Carter 
had made significant progress towards achieving a diverse bench, appoint-
ing forty-one women (15.7% of total Carter appointees and 3.7% of all 
judges at the end of Carter’s term), thirty-seven African-Americans (14.2% 
for Carter, 5.6% of all judges), and sixteen Hispanics (6.1% for Carter, 
2.3% of all judges).6 
Years later, with racial, ethnic, and gender imbalance still plaguing the 
federal courts, Democratic presidents have followed President Carter’s lead 
by promising to implement appointment strategies designed to increase di-
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1  See JOHN A. MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 26–31 (1995). 
2  For example, when President Woodrow Wilson nominated the first Jewish Supreme Court Justice, 
Louis Brandeis, he was vehemently opposed by conservative probusiness and anti-Semitic groups.  See 
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 437–42 (2009).  Similarly, white Southern senators 
fought the confirmation of Thurgood Marshall, the first African-American on the Supreme Court.  See 
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 332–38 (2000). 
3  I identified these judges through searches of the database available at History of the Federal Judi-
ciary, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/research_categories.html (last vi-
sited Aug. 18, 2011).  To identify the percentages of blacks, Hispanics, and women on the bench at the 
time Carter took office, I searched separately by gender, race, and ethnicity for all judges confirmed be-
fore January 1, 1977, and terminated after January 1, 1977.  I then identified the total number of judges 
on the bench on January 1, 1977, by adding together the number of men and women that were confirmed 
and terminated according to the above criteria.  No judges were confirmed between January 1, 1977, and 
Carter’s inauguration. 
4  See NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL 
COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 77–78 (2005). 
5  The 1976 Democratic Party platform stated: “All diplomats, federal judges and other major offi-
cials should be selected on a basis of qualifications.  At all levels of government services, we will re-
cruit, appoint and promote women and minorities.”  Democratic Party Platforms: Democratic Party 
Platform of 1976, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 12, 1976), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=29606 (emphasis added). 
6  The same database search protocol used with respect to judicial diversity statistics prior to Carter’s 
term, see supra note 3, was followed to identify the percentage of blacks, Hispanics, and women on the 
bench at the end of Carter’s term except that the search selected for judges confirmed before January 1, 
1981, and terminated after January 1, 1981. 
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versity.7  President Clinton appointed the lowest percentage of white males 
(52.2%) to the bench in history.8  President Obama appears to be on the 
same course.  In his first two years in office, Obama appointed a total of 
sixty-two judges to the federal courts; only 29.0% of them were white 
males.9  Reagan, however, did not follow this selection strategy.10 
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, the diversity debate has 
typically broken down along party lines.  This is not altogether surprising 
given the parties’ positions on “affirmative action.”11  Thus far, only Demo-
cratic presidents—Carter, Clinton, and Obama—have implemented large-
scale diversity initiatives for the appointment of judges to the federal 
 
7  Although the 1992 and 1996 Democratic Party platforms were silent on Clinton’s intended judicial 
appointment strategy, he promised during the course of the 1992 campaign to make the courts “look like 
America.”  Jo Mannies, Clinton Goes on Attack Here, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 1992, at 1A.  
However, the 1992 platform states explicitly that the party supports use of “affirmative action” to end 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and gender.  Democratic Party Platforms: Democratic Party 
Platform of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 13, 1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=29610. 
The 2008 Democratic Party platform stated, “For our Judiciary, we will select and confirm judges 
who are men and women of unquestionable talent and character, who firmly respect the rule of law, who 
listen to and are respectful of different points of view, and who represent the diversity of America.”  
Democratic Party Platforms: 2008 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 25, 
2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78283 (emphasis added). 
8  I obtained this data through the Federal Judicial Center database, see History of the Federal Judi-
ciary, supra note 3, by searching the categories “race or ethnicity,” “gender,” and “appointing president” 
and then dividing the number of judges in each of these categories by the total number of Clinton ap-
pointees. 
9  I obtained this data through the Federal Judicial Center database, see History of the Federal Judi-
ciary, supra note 3, by searching the categories “race or ethnicity” and “gender” for all Obama appoin-
tees. 
10  See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 81.  The only underrepresented group that fared well during the 
two Republican Administrations following Carter was women.  President Reagan named one woman to 
the Supreme Court (25% of total Reagan appointments to the Court), six to the courts of appeals (7.2% 
of total appointments to the appellate courts), and twenty-four to the district courts (8.3% of district 
court appointments).  See History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 3 (searching Reagan appointees 
by gender).  Minorities fared much worse.  President Reagan appointed no African-Americans or His-
panics to the Supreme Court; one African-American (1.2%) and one Hispanic (1.2%) to the courts of 
appeals; and six African-Americans (2.1%) and thirteen Hispanics (4.5%) to the district courts.  See id. 
(searching Reagan appointees by race and ethnicity).  Similarly, President George H.W. Bush appointed 
one African-American to the Supreme Court (50.0% of total Court appointments); two African-
Americans (4.8% of total appellate appointments made), two Hispanics (5.8%), and seven women 
(16.7%) to the courts of appeals; and ten African-Americans (6.8%), six Hispanics (4.1%), and twenty-
nine women (19.6%) to the district courts.  See id. (searching Bush appointees by gender, race, and eth-
nicity).  Notwithstanding Republicans’ opposition to affirmative action, Presidents Reagan, George 
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush all considered diversity to varying degrees when making high-profile 
judicial appointments.  See infra notes 117–41 and accompanying text. 
11  During the 1970s, general remedies were commonly referred to as “affirmative action.”  Today 
that term is associated with the concept of fostering racial, ethnic, and gender quotas; the term is thus 
politically charged.  Accordingly, I alternatively refer to affirmative action as a “diversity plan,” “diver-
sity initiative,” “diversity strategy,” and “diversity mandate.”  I make exceptions only when characteriz-
ing conservative arguments because the term “affirmative action” is still widely used in that context. 
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courts.12  Republican presidents, on the other hand, have shied away from 
publicly endorsing diversity strategies for the federal bench and have re-
jected their use in other contexts as well;13 Republicans have typically ad-
vocated a “color-blind” system for awarding government benefits and 
jobs.14 
Democratic proponents of a judicial appointment strategy designed to 
increase diversity have relied on three principal justifications: (1) diversity 
helps remedy past systemic discrimination in the judicial selection 
process,15 (2) diversity serves as a symbol for the members of groups that 
have been historically underrepresented on the bench,16 and (3) diversity en-
sures that more voices are heard in the decisionmaking process.17  Republi-
can opponents of an appointment strategy designed to increase diversity 
also rely on three main arguments, all of which echo arguments made by 
conservatives in opposition to affirmative action: (1) affirmative action 
hurts, rather than helps, minorities and women;18 (2) diversity candidates are 
 
12  See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 327–35 (1997) (comparing Reagan’s minority and female appointees 
with Carter’s); SCHERER, supra note 4, at 80 (comparing Reagan’s and George H.W. Bush’s lower court 
diversity appointments with Carter’s).  But see SCHERER, supra note 4, at 327–34 (noting that, although 
he did not appear to implement a large-scale initiative, Reagan did appoint several Italian-Americans, 
fourteen Hispanics, two Asian-Americans, and thirty women to the federal bench, including Justice San-
dra Day O’Connor). 
13  See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989) (showing that George 
H.W. Bush’s Administration, through an amicus brief, argued against the use of affirmative action pro-
grams); Drew S. Days, III, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 
19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 309, 318 & n.47 (1984) (reporting the Reagan Administration’s “position that 
it will not under any circumstances seek hiring goals and timetables to remedy proven employment dis-
crimination”). 
14  See, e.g., Republican Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (Aug. 17, 1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25847 (“We believe in the 
Constitution and its guarantee of color-blind equal opportunity.”); see also LESLIE G. CARR, “COLOR-
BLIND” RACISM 122 (1997) (reporting that the “color-blind” position became part of the Republican 
Party platform beginning with Reagan in 1980). 
15  See Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising It Higher?: Affirmative Action and Judicial 
Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 270, 272 (1983). 
16  Diversity signals that minorities have equal ability to rule, see Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks 
Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. POL. 628, 628 (1999), and 
it provides minorities with professional role models to emulate, see ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF 
PRESENCE 62–63 (1995) (acknowledging the argument that the election of female political candidates 
sets an example that “raise[s] women’s self-esteem, encourage[s] others to follow in their footsteps, and 
dislodge[s] deep-rooted assumptions about what is appropriate to women and men”). 
17  Cf. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 83–84 (1967).  For example, 
gay rights issues are more likely to be taken up by the legislature with the presence of gay legislators.  
Donald P. Haider-Markel, Mark R. Joslyn & Chad J. Kniss, Minority Group Interests and Political Re-
presentation: Gay Elected Officials in the Policy Process, 62 J. POL. 568, 575–76 (2000). 
18  It is said that affirmative action brands minorities and women with a “badge of inferiority.”  Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment). 
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actually less qualified than nondiversity candidates;19 and (3) diversity initi-
atives constitute reverse discrimination, leading to white backlash.20 
I maintain that, when one parses the political rhetoric from the left and 
right on the diversity issue, there seems to be a previously unidentified 
point of consensus.  Both parties want to maintain and enhance the legiti-
macy of the federal courts through their respective appointment strategies 
(diversity versus color-blind selection).  The problem is that neither strategy 
in its current form is capable of conferring universal legitimacy on the fed-
eral courts.  Research suggests that the Democrats’ diversity strategy may 
raise legitimacy levels according to minorities but decrease it according to 
whites.21  At the same time, the Republicans’ color-blind approach main-
tains the status quo for minorities and whites.  Under this strategy, whites 
continue to dominate the federal bench, leaving whites’ levels of legitimacy 
high and minorities’ levels low.  I refer to this conundrum as the “paradox 
of diversity.” 
The remainder of this Article will be organized as follows.  Part I de-
tails the principal arguments made by political elites in favor of diversity 
strategies for judicial appointments, and Part II presents the opposing argu-
ments.  I draw on a number of sources, including exclusive face-to-face in-
terviews with sitting district court judges.22  The interviews provide direct 
 
19  See, e.g., LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE 
NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 18 (1980) (responding to 
criticisms that the judicial selection system had produced an “essentially all white, male judiciary[,] At-
torney General Griffin Bell has stated that the system’s ‘deficiencies have been largely that the pool of 
potential candidates has been very limited and that there has been a general unevenness in the quality of 
candidates.’” (quoting Griffin Bell, “Merit Selection” and Political Reality, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1978, 
at A15)).  Although Griffin Bell was a very conservative Southern Democrat at the time (before the rea-
lignment of the South) he would likely be considered a Republican today.  Moreover, he was often at 
odds with the White House he served on the issue of diversity appointments.  See GOLDMAN, supra note 
12, at 239–41, 254, 257.  For the Republican criticism that female nominees are not qualified, see infra 
note 155. 
20  Republicans and conservatives often maintain that, by prioritizing the selection of minorities and 
women, more qualified white males are passed over for government appointments.  See infra text ac-
companying notes 172–82. 
21  See Nancy Scherer & Brett Curry, Does Descriptive Race Representation Enhance Institutional 
Legitimacy? The Case of the U.S. Courts, 72 J. POL. 90, 93–94, 101 (2010). 
22  I interviewed nineteen district court judges from July to September 2009.  The judges hailed from 
three northeastern urban jurisdictions (and five separate divisions), and they were chosen because of 
their diversity.  All minority judges and women judges in these five divisions were contacted by letter 
and by telephone to request an interview.  Of the ten minority males contacted, four agreed to interviews 
(40% response rate).  Six minority female judges were contacted, and two were interviewed (33.3% re-
sponse rate).  Fourteen white females were contacted, and nine were interviewed (64.2% response rate).  
In addition to these diversity appointees, thirty white male judges (equal to the number of females and 
minorities contacted) from these five district court divisions were contacted in the same manner.  They 
were selected in order to vary the jurisdiction and appointing presidents.  Five white male judges agreed 
to interviews (13.3% response rate).  Judges interviewed were appointed by Presidents Reagan, George 
H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush. 
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insight into the views of minority and female judges—themselves diversity 
appointees—on the benefits and drawbacks of a judicial selection strategy 
centered on diversity, and the interviews also help to identify whether white 
male judges harbor any resentment toward such a strategy.  Collectively, 
the interviews help to develop a framework for understanding the contours 
of the diversity debate as it relates to federal judicial selection. 
In Part III, I discuss how both ends of the political continuum have the 
same goal in designing an appointment strategy: to enhance and preserve 
the legitimacy of the U.S. justice system in the eyes of the public.  In Part 
IV, I discuss the paradox of diversity and the failure of the political parties’ 
current judicial selection strategies to achieve the goal of universal legiti-
macy.  I also argue that there may be a way to design an appointment strat-
egy that preserves diversification efforts yet still promotes universal 
legitimacy for the courts.23  I conclude by offering one hypothesis that may 
prove fruitful in breaking through the impasse on diversification of the fed-
eral bench and allow diversity efforts to continue while maintaining the le-
gitimacy of the federal courts among both whites and minorities. 
I. ARGUMENTS FAVORING A DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Remedying Past Discrimination 
In the 1970s, courts and political leaders faced the challenge of crafting 
meaningful remedies to address the legacy of discrimination against minori-
ties and women.24  Such redress was grounded in principles of equity25 and 
 
Admittedly, this is not a random sample of all district court judges across the nation.  Besides being 
concentrated in one region of the country, participants were those judges willing to sit for interviews, not 
those chosen by random sampling techniques.  Thus, these findings cannot be generalized to all judges 
on the bench.  However, I do not intend to use the interviews to draw broad generalizations about the 
attitudes of all federal court judges.  I instead use interview testimony only to aid in formulating theories 
about diversity on the bench, and thus the lack of a random national sample is not relevant here.  Similar 
uses of qualitative evidence are common in the social sciences.  See, e.g., CARL F. AUERBACH & LOUISE 
B. SILVERSTEIN, QUALITATIVE DATA: AN INTRODUCTION TO CODE AND ANALYSIS (2003); William 
M.K. Trochim, Research Methods Knowledge Base: Qualitative Measures, WEB CENTER FOR SOC. RES. 
METHODS (2006), http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qual.php. 
23  Note that increasing the number of women on the bench, unlike other minorities, does not seem 
to lower levels of legitimacy according to males.  See Nancy Scherer & Brett Curry, Judges and Gender: 
Descriptive Representation’s Consequences for Judicial Legitimacy 23–24 (Aug. 30, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (presented at the 2007 Annual Conference of the American Political 
Science Association in Chicago, Illinois). 
24  See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1971). 
25  See, e.g., id. at 12 (“In fashioning and effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be 
guided by equitable principles.  Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in 
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.” (quoting 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299–300 (1955) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  The “root 
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implemented active measures to ensure equal opportunity for all.26  Some 
affirmative action plans were implemented under court order,27 and some 
were adopted voluntarily by Congress or Executive Branch officials.28  But 
during this period, affirmative action plans were understood to be a means 
to remedy past discrimination.29  Affirmative action plans could take a va-
riety of forms.30  At one end of the spectrum were government-ordered hir-
 
idea of equity . . . [is] that law should be administered fairly.”  W.S. Holdsworth, The Early History of 
Equity, 13 MICH. L. REV. 293, 293 (1915). 
26  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BLACK STUDIES 3–4 (Molefi K. Asante & Ama Mazama eds., 2005). 
27  See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. 1 (reviewing several cases in which federal courts ordered desegrega-
tion and reviewing various school boards’ responses to those orders). 
28  See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 488 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that Congress could require federal 
government grantees with public works contracts to award 10% of subcontracting work to minority-
owned businesses); William A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, The Changing Culture of Affirmative Ac-
tion, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
373, 373–74 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994) (describing the Philadelphia Plan, by which Labor Department 
officials established minority hiring plans in the construction industry in major cities). 
29  See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC 
POLICY, at x (1987) (“‘Quotas’ or ‘goals and timetables’ became the norm in solving disputes over dis-
crimination or appropriate degree of ‘affirmative action.’”); Gamson & Modigliani, supra note 28, at 
374 (“The [Philadelphia] plan set specific numerical [hiring] goals for each of the building and construc-
tion trades . . . .  Labor Department officials announced that ‘because of the deplorably low rate of em-
ployment among members of minority groups’ in the [construction] industry, they would set up similar 
plans in other major cities.”); J. Edward Kellough, Affirmative Action in Government Employment, 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Sept. 1992, at 117, 119 (“All affirmative action programs are in-
tended as a force for justice in employment policy.  [Equal employment opportunity] efforts in general 
are designed to guarantee that people who have historically been barred from employment or promotion 
because of race, ethnicity, or sex are no longer denied opportunities for such reasons.”); Erin Kelly & 
Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer Response to Antidi-
scrimination Law, 1961–1996, in COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 87, 91 (John David Skrentny ed., 2001) (“The scope of [affirmative ac-
tion] law expanded through the OFCC’S [Office of Federal Contract Compliance] Order 4 in early 1970, 
which required employers to submit detailed reports on their employment patterns and explicit plans to 
remedy inequality.”); Bernard Rosen, Affirmative Action Produces Equal Employment Opportunity for 
All, 34 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 237, 238 (1974) (“Meaningful response is now being made to the problems of 
those who have not participated in the competition for public employment, or who even now cannot do 
so successfully because the system may have been designed and operated without taking them into ac-
count.  The response has taken a variety of approaches, depending on the nature of the problems of the 
work force and the needs of the employer.  Generally, successful equal employment opportunity pro-
grams comprise a full range of affirmative actions.  These actions are tailored to the problems of those 
who because of past discriminations are not competing successfully for entry into the system; or who, 
once on the rolls, are unable to realize their full potential because of gaps in education or skills, also of-
ten due to past discrimination.”); Finis Welch, Affirmative Action and Its Enforcement, 71 AM. ECON. 
REV. 127, 127 (“The term, affirmative action, was first used in this context in an Executive Order which 
required federal contractors to take affirmative action to eliminate effects of past discrimination and to 
protect against current discrimination.”). 
30  For example, in Swann the Court ordered, among other things, racial quotas and the busing of 
students to different schools to achieve school integration in the South.  402 U.S. at 22–32.  In Fullilove, 
the Court upheld an affirmative action provision in the Carter Administration’s Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977 that imposed a 10% quota for minority-owned businesses as subcontractors on federal 
government contracts.  448 U.S. at 453–54, 491–92. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 594 
ing quotas for minority and female job candidates.31  At the other end were 
government-ordered task forces charged with examining issues of race or 
gender equality.32 
A product of his time, President Carter framed his federal judicial se-
lection strategy, the first widespread diversity initiative for the federal 
courts, as an affirmative action plan.33  Applying the equitable remedy for 
past discrimination to the judicial selection process, Carter issued three crit-
 
31  See Gamson & Modigliani, supra note 28, at 373–74. 
32  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,138, 3 C.F.R. 393 (1980). 
33  See BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 19, at 34 (quoting Margaret McKenna, the Deputy Assis-
tant for the White House Office of Legal Counsel, as stating that early in his presidency Carter had a 
“firm commitment to affirmative action in the judicial selection process and [a] concern that the pa-
nels . . . find and recruit minority groups and nontraditional candidates for the federal bench.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); GOLDMAN, supra note 12, at 241 (“Carter was personally committed to af-
firmative action and was concerned that it play out well, particularly for appeals court appointments, 
which clearly were tied to Carter’s innovative merit selection commission.”); W. Gary Fowler, A Com-
parison of Initial Recommendation Procedures: Judicial Selection Under Reagan and Carter, 1 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 299, 300 (1983) (characterizing Carter’s judicial selection strategy as focused on “affir-
mative action”); Jon Gottschall, Carter’s Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action 
and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 166–67 (1983); Sa-
rah Wilson, Appellate Judicial Appointments During the Clinton Presidency: An Inside Perspective, 5 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 29, 37 n.9 (2003).  As President Carter’s White House Counsel put it at an ad-
dress to the D.C. Bar: 
The President has two goals in the selection process.  Two goals of equal importance.  One is to 
continue to appoint only judges of high quality; the other is to open the selection process to 
groups, such as minorities and women, which historically have had little representation on the fed-
eral bench. 
Mary L. Clark, Carter’s Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the Federal Bench: His Other 
“Human Rights” Record, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1131, 1138 n.27 (quoting Robert J. 
Lipshutz, White House Counsel, Address to the D.C. Bar 4 (Jan. 25, 1979) (on file with the Carter Pres-
idential Library)).  President Carter at times also referenced descriptive and substantive representation as 
benefits flowing from his diversity plan.  See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 77–78. 
Neither President Clinton nor President Obama ever indicated that his diversity plans were intended 
as remedial actions or that they were “affirmative action” plans.  This is perhaps due to the fact that Su-
preme Court case law after 1980 began applying a strict scrutiny analysis to benign preferences rather 
than the intermediate scrutiny standard in place during the Carter Administration that gave greater defe-
rence to the government to engage in diversity initiatives.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–95 (1989).  Clinton and Obama instead relied on descriptive and subs-
tantive representation, respectively, to justify using diversity initiatives.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 70–81 and 110–16.  However, one minority female judge I interviewed suggested that President 
Clinton, as a white progressive from the South, was likely to have tacitly endorsed the justification of 
remedying past discrimination for diversity appointments: 
I think when you . . . are from the South, you cannot help but think about the inequities [between 
the races] from the past and [ways to] try and right them . . . .  [I]f you were just alive [during the 
Jim Crow era] and had some inkling of law, it is hard not to be cognizant about Brown [v. Board of 
Education] and what it did to the South[,] . . . [t]he recalcitrance of most [white] folks to any kind 
of enforcement of the [Brown decision].  With regard to Carter and Clinton, I think that [remedy-
ing past discrimination] is part of [their justification for diversity appointments]. 
Interview with Judge E (Aug. 12, 2009).  In compliance with the confidentiality agreements I have with 
all judges interviewed, I assign to each a letter of the alphabet rather than identifying them by name. 
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ical executive orders aimed at remedying the past systemic exclusion of mi-
norities and women from consideration for judgeships.  First, Carter set out 
to dismantle the traditional method of selecting lower court judges—
senatorial courtesy—which had perpetuated the old white boys’ network.34  
Second, Carter directed the appellate merit selection committees to make 
“special efforts” to identify minorities and women for appellate vacancies.35  
Third, Carter directed his Attorney General to make “an affirmative ef-
fort . . . to identify qualified candidates, including women and members of 
minority groups” for federal judgeships.36 
Carter himself also characterized his selection strategy as one meant to 
redress the lack of women and minorities on the bench.  In signing the Om-
nibus Judgeship Act on October 20, 1978, Carter explained: 
This act provides a unique opportunity to begin to redress another disturbing 
feature of the Federal judiciary: the almost complete absence of women or 
members of minority groups . . . .  I am committed to these appointments, and 
pleased that this act recognizes that we need more than token representation on 
the Federal bench.37 
What form these “affirmative effort[s]” should take was less apparent.  
President Carter supported the whole spectrum of equitable remedies, in-
cluding quotas, outside the judicial selection arena.38  As for the federal 
courts, however, Carter acknowledged that quotas were desirable but un-
feasible: “If I didn’t have to get Senate confirmation of appointees, I could 
 
34  Carter issued Executive Order 11,972, which created merit selection committees for all appellate 
court jurisdictions.  3 C.F.R. 96 (1978), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,059, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1979).  The 
Order wrested from home state senators (overwhelmingly white men) the power to bestow appellate 
judgeships on their patrons (also overwhelmingly white men).  See Larry Berkson, Susan Carbon & 
Alan Neff, A Study of the U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission: Findings, Conclusions and Rec-
ommendations, 63 JUDICATURE 104, 105 (1979); Clark, supra note 33, at 1139, 1148.  Carter believed 
that these committees could reverse the systemic exclusion of minorities and women from the federal 
bench.  However, Carter was never able to persuade senators to cede power over district court nomi-
nations.  SCHERER, supra note 4, at 79. 
35  See Exec. Order No. 12,059, supra note 34, at 182 (“Each panel is encouraged to make special ef-
forts to seek out and identify well qualified women and members of minority groups as potential nomi-
nees.”), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,097, 3 C.F.R. 254 (1979). 
36  See Exec. Order No. 12,097, supra note 35, at 255 (emphasis added), revoked by Exec. Order No. 
12,553, 51 Fed. Reg. 7,237, 7,242 (Feb. 25, 1986).  It is particularly telling that Carter framed his affir-
mative action plan in terms of groups rather than individuals.  This suggests that Carter’s plan was in-
tended to be a remedy for past discrimination against groups rather than individuals.  In the 1970s, it 
was deemed acceptable for an affirmative action plan to provide a remedy for past discrimination 
against certain groups through active steps to help promote members of these groups.  See, e.g., Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 488 U.S. 448 (1980). 
37  Presidential Statement on Signing H.R. 7843 into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1803 (Oct. 20, 1978). 
38  See Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, § 102(b), 91 Stat. 116, 117 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006)) (establishing that no money would be granted to state and local gov-
ernments unless at least 10% of the projects undertaken with the grant were awarded to minority 
businesses). 
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just tell you flatly that 12 percent of all my judicial appointments would be 
black and three percent would be Spanish speaking and 40 percent would 
be women.”39  Although interbranch political constraints kept President 
Carter from initiating strictly enforced quotas, he appears to have had cer-
tain minority and gender hiring goals in mind for his appointments.40  Carter 
is also known to have ignored white male senators’ recommendations for 
district court nominations when they put forth the name of a white man, ra-
ther than an available minority or female candidate, for a district court va-
cancy.41 
White judges (male and female) interviewed for this project uniformly 
dismissed the notion that diversity appointments should be made in the 
twenty-first century to remedy discrimination that ended decades ago.42  To 
the contrary, one such judge maintained that minorities today enjoy an ad-
vantage over whites in garnering federal judicial nominations.  Comment-
ing on past discrimination, the judge stated, “I think it’s time to stop feeling 
guilty.  Today, it is just the opposite.  If you are a well qualified minority 
then you are sought after [for a judgeship].”43  A few minority judges con-
curred that the time for talk about remedying past discrimination has 
passed, including one minority male judge who explained, “I am not wor-
ried historically about what happened—I’m worried presently what will 
happen in the future.”44 
A majority of African-American and Hispanic judges interviewed 
(both male and female), however, were not so quick to dismiss the justifica-
tion of diversity appointments to remedy past discrimination.  When asked 
about how to address the current underrepresentation of minorities and 
women on the federal bench, a minority female judge was quick to point 
 
39  SCHERER, supra note 4, at 80 (quoting Elliott E. Slotnick, supra note 15, at 277 (quoting Presi-
dent Carter)). 
40  President Carter was said to have promised a group of African-American leaders from the South 
that he would appoint a black judge to every U.S. district court in the former Confederate states.  See 
Wilson, supra note 33, at 37 n.9. 
41  See GOLDMAN, supra note 12, at 260–64 (describing instances in which Carter bypassed a sena-
tor’s suggestion of a white male nominee in favor of a minority or female nominee or negotiated with 
senators in order to achieve racial diversity in the nominations).  President Carter’s White House Coun-
sel was often at odds with his Attorney General, Griffin Bell, who insisted that there was a dearth of 
qualified minority and female lawyers from which to choose jurists for the bench.  See Clark, supra note 
33, at 1138. 
42  Notably, not a single white female judge interviewed saw this justification for diversity appoint-
ments as applicable to appointments of women; they instead discussed the past-discrimination remedy 
only in terms of racial and ethnic discrimination.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has echoed this senti-
ment when discussing the number of women on the federal bench.  Panel, Women on the Bench, 
12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 361, 370 (2003) (remarks of Justice Ginsburg) (“With women in law 
schools in the fifty percent range, one need not worry about the numbers.  Women hold up half the sky 
and they will do so in our courts.  They need no favors.”). 
43  Interview with Judge A (July 31, 2009). 
44  Interview with Judge B (Aug. 12, 2009). 
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out that any discussion about achieving diversity today must first acknowl-
edge past systemic discrimination against minorities, such as the bar against 
admission of minorities previously instituted by many law schools.45  A 
male minority judge put it this way: 
We are not a fair and just society if we have a portion of the population that is 
excluded [from serving in a government institution]. . . .  Because there had 
historically been outright discrimination against certain parts of the population, 
we were not a just society. . . .  Remedying past discrimination creates a just 
society—recasting [the courts] . . . so people do not feel excluded.46 
B. Descriptive Representation 
Descriptive representatives are those who “stand[] for” or are “suffi-
ciently like” constituents who are members of the same racial, ethnic, gend-
er, or other identity group.47  In theory, were an institution truly descriptive, 
it would mirror the demographics of our nation.48  The concept that our po-
litical institutions should reflect our population’s diverse makeup is as old 
as the United States.  In Federalist No. 39, Madison opined that a repre-
sentative government is only deemed legitimate if its institutions draw from 
all sectors of the population: “It is essential to [a republican] government, 
that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from . . . a favored 
class of it . . . .”49  In modern times, descriptive representation encompasses 
the idea that “Black legislators represent Black constituents, women legisla-
tors represent women constituents, and so on.”50 
Whereas equitable remedies designed to redress past discrimination are 
purely instrumental in nature, descriptive representation serves both instru-
mental and symbolic purposes.  Instrumentally, descriptive representation 
may directly translate into better substantive representation for underrepre-
sented groups.51  In this way, it helps ensure that ours is a government “of 
 
45  Interview with Judge C (Sept. 1, 2009). 
46  Interview with Judge D (July 17, 2009). 
47  PITKIN, supra note 17, at 80 (citing A. Phillips Griffiths & Richard Wollheim, How Can One 
Person Represent Another?, 34 ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y (SUPP.) 187 (1960)). 
48  See id. at 73. 
49  THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 210 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, Foresman & 
Co. 1898).  Admittedly, the Framers did not contemplate equality for blacks, women, or the poor, but 
the concept of descriptive representation is at the heart of Madison’s statement.  See PITKIN, supra note 
17, at 60 (“A representative legislature . . . ‘should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at 
large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them.’” (quoting Letter from John Adams to John Penn, 
in IV THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 205 (Boston, Little Brown 1851)). 
50  Mansbridge, supra note 16, at 629. 
51  See, e.g., Haider-Markel, Joslyn & Kniss, supra note 17, at 573 (finding a correlation between the 
presence of gay and lesbian officials and the adoption of domestic partner registration programs); Man-
sbridge, supra note 16, at 643–48 (explaining that “[w]hen [voter] interests are uncrystallized, the best 
way to have one’s most important substantive interests represented is often to choose a representative 
whose descriptive characteristics match one’s own on the issues one expects to emerge” because “a vot-
er can expect the representative to react more or less the way the voter would have”); Leslie A. 
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the people, by the people, for the people.”52  Symbolically, descriptive re-
presentation signals to underrepresented groups that “certain features of 
one’s identity do not mark one as less able to govern.”53  Moreover, a de-
scriptive representative may serve as a role model who stands as a symbol 
to others in her group that they too can achieve success at the highest eche-
lons of our government.54  Thus, descriptive representation looks not at the 
historical underpinnings of discrimination against minorities and women, 
but rather at both the present (which identity groups are currently underre-
presented) and the future (how the symbolism of diversity might influence 
future generations of minorities and women). 
Several of the white female judges I interviewed supported descriptive 
representation on the bench specifically because of its powerful symbolism 
and cited Justice Sotomayor as an example.55  One white female judge 
stated it this way: “[I]f you work hard, you can achieve.  Sotomayor has set 
an example and created an opportunity for other Hispanics.”56  Another 
white female judge echoed these sentiments, describing Justice Soto-
mayor’s appointment as “incredibly important” because, for the federal ju-
diciary “to have legitimacy, people have to be able to see it as a place they 
can aspire to [join], that it is to some extent reflective of the democratic so-
ciety.”57 
Minority judges interviewed also tended to focus on the symbolism of 
descriptive representation though none directly referenced Justice Soto-
mayor.  As one minority male judge stated: 
I think [descriptive representation] is a laudable goal, but more important, it’s 
a realistic goal that is important for the country to see. . . .  [I]magine how the 
country shortchanges itself when it, for instance on gender, says to half the 
population, we don’t believe you can be in [the U.S. courts]. . . .  I can tell you 
that in the minority community, we were really very proud of Judge [X], the 
 
Schwindt-Bayer & William Mishler, An Integrated Model of Women’s Representation, 67 J. POL. 407, 
412 (2005). 
52  Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at http://showcase.netins.
net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm. 
53  Mansbridge, supra note 16, at 651. 
54  See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1109, 1116 
(2003); Mansbridge, supra note 16, at 649; Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Par-
tisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1430–31 (2008). 
55  Once again, white female judges focused not on the underrepresentation of women on the bench 
but on the underrepresentation of minorities.  This is true notwithstanding the fact that I informed each 
judge that women are the most underrepresented group, comprising 50% of the general U.S. population 
but only 20% of the federal bench. 
56  Interview with Judge A, supra note 43. 
57  Interview with Judge F (July 30, 2009); see also Interview with Judge A, supra note 43 (“This 
nomination was positive in two ways.  First, there is now someone in a high position who represents 
Hispanics.  Second, [Sotomayor] is someone who went to the best schools and she’s respected across the 
board.”). 
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first black and first woman to sit [in this jurisdiction]. . . .  [S]he was real-
ly . . . a paragon.58 
A minority female judge saw descriptive representation in similar terms: 
The courts are supposed to be for the people . . . and when the community has 
a certain representation, the bench needs to at least reflect that in some degree 
because, you know, . . . I think the public deserves that quite honestly.  It’s not 
some bastion of elitism that no one can get to except if you are a white male.   
So I think it’s important for the community and for what we’re supposed to be 
here for, which is justice.  So it should be for one and for all.  So it has to be 
done by one and all.59 
Descriptive representation is not without its critics.  Many political 
scholars contend that minority and gender groups are not necessarily served 
by leaders who are descriptively representative of them but are better served 
by substantive representatives.60  Others argue that descriptive representa-
tion incorrectly assumes that all members of a single group are alike.61  The 
most cynical of scholars question how far we should take this theory: 
should “morons” represent “morons”?62 
Moving from normative theory to refutable hypotheses, how does the 
theory of descriptive representation stand up to empirical analysis?  Scho-
 
58  Interview with Judge M (Sept. 10, 2009). 
59  Interview with Judge E, supra note 33; see also Interview with Judge F, supra note 57 (“For the 
[judicial] institution to have legitimacy, people have to be able to see it as a place they can aspire 
to . . . .”). 
60  See, e.g., CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF 
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 5 (2006) (arguing that increasing the number of black representa-
tives in political offices does not necessarily translate into blacks’ substantive interests being better 
served in Congress); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 87–89 (2000) (arguing that 
women, among other groups, are not a monolithic group that can be substantively represented by a sin-
gle female representative); Mansbridge, supra note 16, at 629–30 (reviewing scholarship that questions 
the value of descriptive representation).  In fact, some have argued that efforts to increase descriptive 
representation in Congress actually decrease minority groups’ overall substantive representation within 
the institution; concentrating black voters within a single district means more white conservatives are 
elected in surrounding districts than would be elected if minority voters were dispersed among several 
districts such that they would elect fewer minorities but more liberal whites.  See Charles Cameron, Da-
vid Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Repre-
sentation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 808 (1996).  This tradeoff between substantive and 
descriptive representation is not at issue in the context of allocating federal judicial seats because selec-
tion rests not in the hands of voters but in those of the President, whose judicial nominees all tend to lie 
close to the President on the ideological continuum.  See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 49–73 (demonstrat-
ing that judges decide cases in line with the issue positions espoused by their appointing presidents). 
61  See Suzanne Dovi, Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Lati-
no Do?, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 729, 740 (2002) (suggesting that class divisions may make wealthier 
black representatives poor substantive representatives of lower class blacks). 
62  REPRESENTATION: YEARBOOK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 11 n.18 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1968) (Professor A. Phillips Grif-
fiths “disposes effectively of the idea of ‘descriptive’ representation . . . .  As he says, no one would ar-
gue that morons should be represented by morons.” (citing Griffiths & Wollheim, supra note 47)). 
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lars of black political behavior have found that descriptive representation 
does aid black constituents.63  Of particular interest to scholars of black pub-
lic opinion is whether a black representative raises blacks’ levels of trust in 
their representatives and the institution of Congress.64 
Far less work has been done on descriptive gender representation.  One 
study suggests that women are more gender conscious than men in their 
evaluation of candidates and prefer female candidates over male candi-
dates.65  However, there is scant evidence that a descriptive female repre-
sentative increases a woman’s trust in her congresswoman66 or that an 
increase in the overall percentage of women within an institution increases 
women’s trust in that institution.67 
 
63  The benefits found to accrue to underrepresented groups include both behavioral and attitudinal 
changes.  On the behavioral side, studies have found that, for African-Americans, having a black de-
scriptive representative leads to better communication between the representative and the constituent, 
see Susan A. Banducci, Todd Donovan & Jeffrey A. Karp, Minority Representation, Empowerment, and 
Participation, 66 J. POL. 534, 544–46 (2004); greater minority voter mobilization, see D. Stephen Voss 
& David Lublin, Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections, 
29 AM. POL. RES. 141, 150 (2001) (reporting greater black voting turnout when a black candidate was 
on the ballot); and greater political activism, see, e.g., FREDRICK C. HARRIS, VALERIA SINCLAIR-
CHAPMAN & BRIAN D. MCKENZIE, COUNTERVAILING FORCES IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN CIVIC ACTIVISM, 
1973–1994, at 4–7 (2006). 
As for public opinion, studies have found that African-Americans (1) rate the performance of a black 
congressman higher than that of a white congressman, see Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier et al., The Effects 
of Political Representation on the Electoral Advantages of House Incumbents, 56 POL. RES. Q. 259, 261 
(2003), and (2) experience increased group pride and empowerment when a black official is elected, see 
PATRICIA GURIN, SHIRLEY HATCHETT & JAMES S. JACKSON, HOPE AND INDEPENDENCE: BLACKS’ 
RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL AND PARTY POLITICS 156 (1989). 
64  Studies examining whether a descriptive representative increases minorities’ trust and confidence 
in a particular political institution have yielded mixed results.  Compare Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. 
Gilliam, Jr., Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377, 
382–83 (1990) (finding that the presence of black local representatives increases blacks’ trust in munici-
pal government), with Claudine Gay, Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the 
Relationship Between Citizens and Their Government, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 717, 729–30 & tbl.5 (2002) 
(concluding that the presence of black congressmen does not increase blacks’ trust in Congress).  Stu-
dies examining whether an aggregate increase in descriptive representation within a particular political 
institution increases trust for that institution among minorities have also reached conflicting conclusions.  
Compare L. Marvin Overby et al., Race, Political Empowerment, and Minority Perceptions of Judicial 
Fairness, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 444, 454 (2005) (finding no change in public trust of the Mississippi state ju-
diciary in response to the presence of black judges), with KATHERINE TATE, BLACK FACES IN THE 
MIRROR: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 151 (2004) (find-
ing increased trust in Congress among blacks who believed there to be strong numbers of blacks in Con-
gress), and Scherer & Curry, supra note 21, at 97 (finding an increase in minority support when blacks 
were told that blacks constitute a greater percentage of the federal bench than of the general population). 
65  See Cindy Simon Rosenthal, The Role of Gender in Descriptive Representation, 48 POL. RES. Q. 
599, 609 (1995). 
66  For one such study, see Jennifer L. Lawless, Politics of Presence? Congresswomen and Symbolic 
Representation, 57 POL. RES. Q. 81, 87 & tbl.1 (2004). 
67  See Scherer & Curry, supra note 23, at 22–23. 
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The theory of descriptive representation is most often debated in the 
context of Congress—should the composition of black, Hispanic, and fe-
male congressional representatives reflect that of the nation?  Unelected 
federal judges, however, do not “represent” constituents in the same way 
that members of Congress do.  Nonetheless, the theory is still applicable to 
the federal judicial system because of the symbolic messages sent to under-
represented groups.  Accordingly, scholars have applied the theory of de-
scriptive representation with equal force when studying the federal judiciary 
despite its unique political nature among the three branches of the national 
government.68  At least one scholar has argued that descriptive representa-
tion is even more critical in the courts than it is in the elected branches: 
“Judges have a more direct and irrevocable impact in the lives of many 
Americans than local or even national legislators.  This is particularly true 
for African Americans, who are disproportionately involved with the judi-
cial system.”69 
By turning the theory of descriptive representation into actual policy, 
President Clinton became the first president to make descriptive representa-
tion the cornerstone of his judicial selection strategy.70  During his 1992 
presidential campaign, Clinton promised to make the cabinet and other ap-
pointed positions “look like America.”71  By increasing the number of 
women, Hispanics, and African-Americans on the bench, Clinton believed 
that the federal judiciary would better reflect the racial, ethnic, and gender 
makeup of the general population: 
 A most troubling aspect of judicial appointments during the Reagan-Bush 
era has been the sharp decline in the selection of women and minority judges, 
at the very time when more and more qualified women and minority candi-
dates were reaching the time of their lives where they could serve as judges.  
While there are many fine women and minority attorneys all over the country 
who would potentially be superb federal judges, Mr. [George H.W.] Bush’s 
appointments fail to reflect the breadth and diversity of the bar, much less that 
of our nation. 
 . . . . 
 
68  See Beverly Blair Cook, Black Representation in the Third Branch, 1 BLACK L.J. 260 (1971); 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 406–10 (2000); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain 
a Rule of Law that Is Inclusive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 
10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 129–37 (2004); Overby et al., supra note 64, at 449–50; Scherer & Curry, 
supra note 21, at 92–93. 
69  Ifill, supra note 68, at 407–08 (footnotes omitted). 
70  President Clinton appointed to the federal bench 194 white men (52.2% of Clinton appointments), 
83 white women (22.3%), 46 black men (12.4%), 15 black women (4.0%), 18 Hispanic men (4.8%), 5 
Hispanic women (1.3%), 4 Asian men (1.1%), and 1 Asian woman (0.3%).  I obtained this data through 
the Federal Judicial Center database, see History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 3, by searching the 
categories “race or ethnicity” and “gender” for all Clinton appointees. 
71  Governor William J. Clinton, Statement at the Third 1992 Presidential Debate (Oct. 19, 1992) 
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/debatingourdestiny/92debates/3prez3.html). 
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 The narrow judicial appointments of George [H.W.] Bush have resulted in 
the emergence of a judiciary that is less reflective of our diverse society than at 
any other time in recent memory.72 
President Clinton’s focus on increasing the public’s confidence in the courts 
through diversity appointments is the very definition of descriptive repre-
sentation.  Several of the judges interviewed for this project agreed.  One 
white male judge stated that descriptive representation “just enhances the 
ability of the populace to feel that [judges] are more believable if our ma-
keup is such that it is more similar to what the populace is.”73  Another 
white male judge stated that increased diversity on the bench “instills confi-
dence in the system.”74 
Other judges made similar remarks but saw the benefits accruing only 
to minorities; they believed descriptive representation for minorities made 
the courts “fairer,”75 more “satisfact[ory],”76 and “friendlier.”77  As dis-
cussed below, the judges’ observations about diversity’s ability to increase 
the courts’ “believability,” “fairness,” and “friendliness” as well as “confi-
dence” and “satisfaction” among citizens are all important components of 
the broader construct of political legitimacy.78 
 
72  Bill Clinton, Judiciary Suffers Racial, Sexual Lack of Balance, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 15, 
15.  Two white female judges I interviewed believed that the relevant comparison group for descriptive 
representation on the federal bench is not a particular jurisdiction’s racial, ethnic, or gender makeup but 
instead the demographic makeup of our nation’s law schools.  According to this formulation of descrip-
tive representation, if 7% of law school graduates nationwide are African-American, then only 7% of all 
district court judges in a hypothetical district court with twenty judges need be African-American even if 
African-Americans comprise 25% of citizens living within that particular court’s jurisdiction.  This 
comparison, however, is not consistent with the theory of descriptive representation, which considers the 
racial, ethnic, and gender makeup of the community’s general population first and foremost.  Thus, to 
satisfy descriptive representation in my hypothetical jurisdiction, five of the twenty judges sitting in that 
court (25% of the total number of judges) should be African-American.  Given that the jurisdiction is 
likely to have at least five black lawyers qualified to sit on the bench, descriptive representation would 
require that 25% of the judges be African-American rather than one black judge pursuant to a 7% for-
mulation. 
Moreover, to use as the comparison group the percentage of minorities graduating from law school 
only perpetuates the underrepresentation of minorities on the bench because blacks are also underrepre-
sented in law schools.  See William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A Histo-
ry of African American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950–2000, 19 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 36–40 & charts 9–11B (2003) (arguing that factors other than qualifications have 
been suppressing law school admissions for blacks); see also Tamar Lewin, Law School Admissions Lag 
Among Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A22 (reporting that law schools have admitted more 
students per class between 1993 and 2008 but that of the numbers of African-American and Mexican-
American law students declined during that period despite overall increases in grade point averages and 
LSAT scores among those minority groups). 
73  Interview with Judge G (Sept. 10, 2009). 
74  Interview with Judge H (Sept. 1, 2009). 
75  Interview with Judge I (July 15, 2009). 
76  Interview with Judge K (Sept. 8, 2009). 
77  Interview with Judge J (Sept. 10, 2009). 
78  Cf. Scherer & Curry, supra note 21, at 95–97. 
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It is not surprising that President Clinton articulated a justification for 
his diversity initiative that was different from that of his Democratic prede-
cessor, President Carter.  Though both presidents wanted to increase diver-
sity on the bench, President Carter served his term during the heyday of 
affirmative action.79  By the time President Clinton ran for president in the 
early 1990s, a majority of white Americans believed that affirmative action 
discriminated against white men.80  Moreover, unlike President Carter, Pres-
ident Clinton had to walk a fine line so as not to run afoul of Supreme Court 
doctrine that, after the Carter presidency, had severely restricted the gov-
ernment’s ability to implement traditional affirmative action plans on the 
basis of remedying past discrimination.81 
When asked whether they believed that presidents should strive to 
make racial, ethnic, and gender diversity on the bench reflect the demo-
graphics of the population, most of the judges interviewed for this Article—
black, white, male, female—were supportive without referencing any spe-
cific hiring goals (or quotas).82  One judge did support the idea of pure de-
scriptive representation for individual communities.83 
Two white male judges, however, expressed only conditional support 
for descriptive representation.  One believed that descriptive characteristics 
other than race, ethnicity, or gender should be considered in striving for a 
bench that mirrors America: “The community in my view should want on 
the judiciary people who they can look up to and also identify with.  And 
that means taking account of a lot of different factors.”84  The other white 
 
79  See SAMUEL LEITER & WILLIAM M. LEITER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
LAW AND POLICY 2–3 (2002); CAROL M. SWAIN, THE NEW WHITE NATIONALISM IN AMERICA: ITS 
CHALLENGE TO INTEGRATION 142–56 (2002) (describing affirmative action programs during the Carter 
Administration). 
80  BRON RAYMOND TAYLOR, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT WORK: LAW, POLITICS, AND ETHICS 141 
(1991). 
81  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (establishing strict scrutiny as 
the standard of review for “federal racial classifications”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989) (holding that state and local governments cannot justify the use of racial quo-
tas based on an “amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry”). 
82  See, e.g., Interview with Judge G, supra note 73 (“I’m of the opinion that certainly efforts should 
be made whenever possible and without the quality being lowered to embrace diversity.  I’m a believer 
of that.”); Interview with Judge J, supra note 77 (“If you’re asking me whether I think that having in-
creased diversity on the bench is a good idea, I think that it is.  I think the more diversity on the bench, 
the better off we are from the standpoint of different life experiences and perspectives that are brought to 
the bench.”); Interview with Judge O (Aug. 4, 2009) (“It enhances the perception of fairness. And it’s 
good for the community.”); Interview with Judge Q (Aug. 5, 2009) (“I think so.  I think it’s a matter of 
public confidence.  I think different perspectives are good.”). 
83  When asked whether the president should increase diversity according to the racial, ethnic, and 
gender demographics in the population, this judge unequivocally responded, “Yes. . . .  [W]hen the 
community has a certain representation, the bench needs to at least reflect that in some degree be-
cause . . . I think the public deserves that quite honestly.”  Interview with Judge E, supra note 33. 
84  Interview with Judge L (July 23, 2009). 
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male judge, while acknowledging that descriptive representation aided mi-
nority communities, worried about white backlash: 
Without question public confidence [in the courts] is important.  It does [exist] 
in some communities and it does not in others.  Communities where it lessens 
their confidence in the courts may believe that affirmative action candidates 
[for the bench] have an agenda.  But [increasing diversity] is very important 
for minority communities.85 
C. Substantive Representation 
The theory of substantive representation holds that those who represent 
the public’s interests should be responsive to the policy views of their con-
stituents, meaning “acting for others, an activity in behalf of, in the interest 
of, as the agent of, someone else.”86  But does the representation of minority 
and female interests necessarily mean that more blacks, Hispanics, and 
women must be present in the halls of power?  Why, for example, could not 
a white liberal Democratic judicial appointee substantively represent the 
views of the black community? 
The answer may lie in the very different life experiences that members 
of certain groups, in this study minority and female judges, have compared 
to white males.87  To the extent that minority and female judges have unique 
perspectives that influence their decisionmaking according to the theory of 
substantive representation, their presence on the bench is necessary to en-
sure that the views of more Americans are considered in the judicial deci-
sionmaking process.  If, however, diversity appointees were to decide cases 
in the same manner as white males (assuming similar political ideologies), 
then diversity on the bench may not be necessary or sufficient to further the 
substantive representation of minorities and women.88 
What does social science research tell us about identity and judging?  
For some scholars, descriptive representation is the only way to achieve 
 
85  Interview with Judge R (July 29, 2009). 
86  PITKIN, supra note 17, at 113. 
87  See Harry T. Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 328 (2002) (de-
scribing how effects of segregation and racial discrimination may give some blacks a heightened aware-
ness in some areas of the law); Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive La Difference?, 
73 JUDICATURE 204, 208 (1990) (explaining that women’s uniquely feminine experiences may lead fe-
male judges to different outcomes in cases containing issues like sex discrimination); Nancy Scherer, 
Blacks on the Bench, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 655, 658–59 (2004) (describing how blacks’ views of legal issues 
surrounding criminal law enforcement and procedures have been shaped by the disparate impact of the 
criminal law on blacks). 
88  At least one political theorist has argued that, even short of distinctive decisionmaking, the mere 
presence of minority groups and women furthers important goals, including undermining the perception 
that the courts are run by white male judges.  See Virginia Sapiro, Research Frontier Essay, When Are 
Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 701, 
712 (1981). 
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true substantive representation for minorities and women.89  There has been 
substantial research examining whether African-American, Hispanic, and 
female legislators vote differently even when their political ideologies are 
held constant; however, the results of these studies vary.90 
 
89  Elisabeth R. Gerber, Rebecca B. Morton & Thomas A. Reitz, Minority Representation in Multi-
member Districts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127, 127 (1998) (reviewing the argument that a demographic 
group’s lack of descriptive representation makes it highly unlikely that it will achieve substantive repre-
sentation); Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, supra note 51, at 413. 
90  For studies and commentary on black substantive representation in Congress, compare TATE, su-
pra note 64, at 85, which finds that black congressmen vote differently than white congressmen, with 
SWAIN, supra note 60, at 5, which argues that descriptive representation by blacks in political office is 
not necessarily accompanied by substantive representation.  Additional findings regarding black repre-
sentation exist.  E.g., DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UN-
INTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 143–44 (1999) (suggesting a supply-side 
theory to redistricting that predicts differences in representational styles based on the type of politician 
elected and the nature of her campaign); DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 72 (1997) (agreeing that blacks and whites 
have different policy preferences and finding that racially driven gerrymandering helps elect more mi-
norities to Congress but leaves Congress in the aggregate less responsive to blacks’ policy preferences); 
KENNY J. WHITBY, THE COLOR OF REPRESENTATION: CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BLACK 
INTERESTS 8–9 & tbl.1 (1997) (delineating certain policy issues about which blacks and whites hold sub-
stantially different opinions). 
Studies on Hispanic legislators and substantive representation have come to varied conclusions.  
Compare Brinck Kerr & Will Miller, Latino Representation, It’s Direct and Indirect, 41 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 1066, 1066 (1997) (finding that Hispanic members of Congress vote differently from non-Hispanic 
members and that Hispanics received at least some substantive representation from liberals in Congress 
regardless of those officials’ ethnic backgrounds), and Susan Welch & John R. Hibbing, Hispanic Re-
presentation in the U.S. Congress, 65 SOC. SCI. Q. 328, 334 (1984) (finding that the voting records of 
Hispanic congressmen reflect increased support for liberal programs as compared to non-Hispanics but 
low descriptive representation, but also suggesting that Hispanics might best secure substantive repre-
sentation, given their low descriptive representation, through non-Hispanic congressmen who are none-
theless responsive to the interests of Hispanics in their districts), with Rodney E. Hero & Caroline J. 
Tolbert, Latinos and Substantive Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives: Direct, Indirect, 
or Nonexistent?, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 640, 648 (1995) (finding no difference in voting patterns between 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic congressmen and thus little substantive representation for Hispanic inter-
ests). 
Studies on female representatives and substantive representation have likewise arrived at multiple 
conclusions.  Compare Kevin Arceneaux, The “Gender Gap” in State Legislative Representation: New 
Data to Tackle an Old Question, 54 POL. RES. Q. 143, 144 (2001) (finding that female legislators vote 
differently from men on women’s issues and introduce legislation relevant to women’s issues more of-
ten); Kathleen A. Frankovic, Sex and Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives: 1961–1975, 5 AM. 
POL. Q. 315, 328 (1977) (finding that the voting behavior of congresswomen as a group differs from that 
of their male counterparts); Rita Mae Kelly, Michelle A. Saint-Germain & Jody D. Horn, Female Public 
Officials: A Different Voice?, 515 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 77, 84 (1991) (same); Michele 
L. Swers, Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women’s Issue Bills Than Their Male Colleagues?, 
23 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 435, 440 (1998) (same); and Arturo Vega & Juanita M. Firestone, The Effects of 
Gender on Congressional Behavior and the Substantive Representation of Women, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 
213, 220 (1995) (finding some differences between male and female voting patterns but affirming that 
party affiliation and district characteristics remain better predictors of decisionmaking), with Susan 
Welch, Are Women More Liberal than Men in the U.S. Congress?, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 125, 131 (1985) 
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As for the courts, in the years following the Carter Administration, a 
sufficient number of minority and female judges sat on the bench, thereby 
enabling researchers to conduct meaningful empirical studies that examined 
whether the legal decisions of minority and female judges were substantive-
ly distinguishable from their white male peers.  As in studies of Congress, 
the judicial political scholars looked for statistically significant differences 
in voting patterns between male and female judges91 and between black and 
white judges,92 holding political ideologies and case facts constant.  The 
findings of these studies also varied.93 
However, the most recent and sophisticated study on the issue of gend-
er and judicial decisionmaking found that a judge’s gender impacted rulings 
in sex discrimination cases.94  Moreover, recent studies on race and judging 
found that descriptive representation leads to better substantive representa-
tion: black judges were found to be more sympathetic to defendants’ Fourth 
Amendment rights than were white judges95 and more likely to vote for 
plaintiffs in race discrimination cases.96  These results suggest that, in cer-
tain areas of law, specifically those that particularly affect women and mi-
norities, the gender and race of the judges can drive judicial outcomes even 
apart from the judges’ ideology.  This belies the notion that the voices of 
white males are representative of minorities and women. 
The judges interviewed for this Article generally acknowledged that 
personal background plays a role in their decisions.  More controversial was 
whether specifically a judge’s race, ethnicity, or gender influences deci-
 
(finding few gender-attributable effects on voting when party affiliation and constituency ideology are 
taken into account). 
There is also one study on the substantive representation of gay constituents, which found that open-
ly gay legislators in local governments better represent the policy interests of the gay community than 
heterosexuals do.  See Haider-Markel, supra note 17, at 575–76. 
91  See Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex 
on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010) [hereinafter Boyd, Epstein & Martin, Untangling the Causal 
Effects]; see also Web Appendix to Boyd, Epstein & Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects, at 2–5 (Oct. 
22, 2009), http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/genderjudgingapp.pdf (summarizing the findings 
of studies comparing male and female judicial behavior). 
92  See Scherer, supra note 87, at 660–62 (discussing previous studies on black versus white judicial 
behavior). 
93  See Boyd, Epstein & Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects, supra note 91, at 390 (finding sex-
based individual and panel effects only in cases involving sex discrimination); Scherer, supra note 87, at 
660–62 (reviewing prior race-effects studies and problems with their designs); see also Deborah Rhode, 
In a “Different” Voice: What Does the Research About How Gender Influences Judging Actually Say?, 
SLATE (June 10, 2009, 4:20 PM) http://www.slate.com/id/2220220 (discussing reasons for the variation 
in the outcomes of studies of male judges’ and female judges’ decisionmaking). 
94  See Boyd, Epstein & Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects, supra note 91, at 390, 401.  Howev-
er, the study reported no sex-based differences in voting in twelve other areas of law.  Id. 
95  See Scherer, supra note 87, at 668; Nancy Scherer, Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Race, Ethnicity 
and Judging (Apr. 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (presented at the 2008 Annual 
Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association). 
96  SCHERER, supra note 4, at 101–02 & tbls.4 & 5. 
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sionmaking.97  Only two judges, a white female and a white male, complete-
ly rejected the notion that a judge’s race, gender, or ethnicity could lead to 
different judicial outcomes.98  The white female judge, echoing Justice 
O’Connor’s famous remark about wise men and wise women,99 asked, 
“What does gender have to do with judging?”100 
The remaining eighteen judges interviewed, a mixture of men and 
women of different ethnicities, acknowledged that a judge’s background 
plays some role in decisionmaking.  They disagreed, however, on the 
weight to be given race, gender, and ethnicity in the decisionmaking 
process. 
Some judges wholly embraced the theory that descriptive representa-
tion leads to better substantive representation.  One white female judge ex-
plained: 
 
97  This controversy is reflected in the differing views of the three women who served on the Su-
preme Court.  Justice O’Connor rejected the theory that gender influences judging, stating that a “wise 
old man and a wise old woman reach the same conclusion.”  Sandra Day O’Connor, Portia’s Progress, 
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1546, 1558 (1991) (quoting Judge Jeanne Coyne of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
in David Margolick, Women’s Milestone: Majority on Minnesota Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at 
B16). 
Justice Ginsburg has expressed mixed views on the subject, agreeing with Justice O’Connor’s obser-
vation about wise men and wise women yet also admitting that “women bring to the table their own ex-
periences, which inform their decision-making.”  Nina Totenberg, How Women Changed the High 
Court . . . and Didn’t, NPR (June 25, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
128079684. 
Justice Sotomayor famously embraced the notion that gender and ethnicity influence decisionmak-
ing: “Justice O’Connor has often been cited as saying that a wise old man and wise old woman will 
reach the same conclusion in deciding cases.  I am . . . not so sure that I agree with the statement.  
First, . . . there can never be a universal definition of wise.  Second, I would hope that a wise Latina 
woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a 
white male who hasn’t lived that life.”  Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA 
RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002).  However, she clarified this statement at her confirmation proceedings.  Con-
firmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of the Su-
preme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 327 
(2009) (statement of then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor) (“It is clear from the attention that my words have 
gotten and the manner in which it has been understood by some people that my words failed.  They 
didn’t work.  The message that the entire speech attempted to deliver, however, remains the message 
that I think Justice O’Connor meant, the message that prior nominees including Justice Alito meant 
when he said that his Italian ancestry he considers when he’s hearing discrimination cases.”). 
98  See Interview with Judge L, supra note 84; Interview with Judge N (Sept. 9, 2009). 
99  See O’Connor, supra note 97, at 1558. 
100  Interview with Judge N, supra note 98; cf. Interview with Judge L, supra note 84 (providing 
anecdotes about the inconsistencies between his own background and some of his most famous rulings). 
One white female judge interviewed for this project cited Justice O’Connor for the opposite proposi-
tion about substantive representation: “We all have our backgrounds and it all impacts on how we perce-
ive events, facts—Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, I remember, actually wrote something about how she 
benefited from having Thurgood Marshall as a colleague.  Everybody does it and that’s not a bad thing.”  
Interview with Judge E, supra note 33 (referencing Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The In-
fluence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217 (1992)). 
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Who you are does affect your decisionmaking. . . .  Your gender informs your 
decisions.  Your race informs your decisions.  So clearly the experiences 
people bring to the bench affect[] their decisions.  In a discrimination case 
where a woman is testifying about being excluded from lunch invitations, golf 
outings, etc., I’ll relate to that. . . .  We identify with those experiences.101 
Similarly, a male minority judge stated, “I think the more diversity on the 
bench, the better off we are from the standpoint of different life experiences 
and perspectives that are brought to the bench.”102  According to him, addi-
tional minority judges “are going to bring different perspectives that are not 
represented across the board at the present time.”103 
For other judges, minority and female voices in the judicial process not 
only are intrinsically valuable for representing members of their identity 
groups but also lead to better decisionmaking.104  A minority male judge ex-
plained: 
I do know that there is a value to having different people at the table. . . .  My 
perspective is it has just got to be better for the decisionmaking process if you 
have input from different perspectives.  I mean, I can’t tell you over the course 
of my lifetime as a [minority] man in America, how many white guys have 
said, as we discussed whatever, “I never thought of that,” or “I never looked at 
this simple situation that way.”105 
A white female judge explained it this way: “I think everybody is applying 
the same law but you [as a minority or female] may be able to see more an-
gles.  The more angles, the better the decision.”106 
There were, however, other judges who cautioned against attributing 
too much to race, ethnicity, or gender.  One minority male judge suggested 
that minority identity may yield “insights that could inform [a judge’s] 
thinking but [that] it is not going to play a major role.”107  Another white 
male judge pointed out that other background factors, such as being a par-
ent, may influence a decision.108 
 
101  Interview with Judge O, supra note 82. 
102  Interview with Judge K, supra note 76. 
103  Id. 
104  There is, in fact, theoretical and empirical research to support this view.  See SCOTT E. PAGE, 
THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND 
SOCIETIES 314 (2007) (explaining that formal models and data establish that better decisions are made 
by groups with diverse members); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS 
UNITE AND DIVIDE 11 (2009) (finding that decisions made by those in a homogenous group tend to be 
more radicalized than moderated). 
105  Interview with Judge M, supra note 58. 
106  Interview with Judge Q, supra note 82. 
107  Interview with Judge D, supra note 46. 
108  Interview with Judge P (Aug. 5, 2009) (“I think gender and race play a role.  I think being a par-
ent plays a role.”). 
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Finally, one minority male judge who supported diversity efforts was 
disappointed that Democratic presidents have not also strived for ideologi-
cal diversity.  He criticized President Clinton for not properly diversifying 
the courts: 
He made it . . . diverse in the context of race, but he didn’t make it diverse as 
far as ideology is concerned. . . .  He should have had some screaming liberals 
in his mix.  I resented that he was chicken. . . .  And I have a feeling that the 
new President [Obama] is chicken in this regard. . . .  I don’t call for just ethnic 
and racial and gender diversity, I call for intellectual diversity. . . .  [B]ut, un-
fortunately, the Democrats are chicken and the Republicans are not with regard 
to ideology.109 
Like Presidents Clinton and Carter before him, President Obama seeks 
to transform a political theory into political policy.  Unlike his Democratic 
predecessors, he is the first president to rely exclusively on the theory of 
substantive representation to justify his diversity policy for the federal 
courts.110  During his campaign for president, then-Senator Obama empha-
sized that we need more judges on the bench with “empathy”111 rather than 
more minority and female judges as his Democratic predecessor had sug-
gested.  It was not immediately clear, though, how President Obama 
planned to identify nominees with empathy.  President Obama has defined 
empathetic judges as those who have struggled in life: “We need somebody 
 
109  Interview with Judge B, supra note 44.  Judge B is not alone in his complaints about a lack of 
ideological diversification.  In fact, liberal groups have criticized President Obama about his second Su-
preme Court nominee, Justice Elena Kagan, claiming that the President should be choosing Justices with 
established liberal records to counterbalance the conservative Justices appointed by George W. Bush.  
See, e.g., Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Said to Pick Solicitor General for Court: Never a Judge, 
Kagan Faces Wariness, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010, at A1. 
110  President Obama may have moved away from President Clinton’s position—descriptive repre-
sentation—because of its negative association with minority and gender quotas and preferences, which 
have been overwhelmingly rejected by the public.  See QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST., U.S. VOTERS 
DISAGREE 3-1 WITH SOTOMAYOR ON KEY CASE (2009), available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/
x1295.xml?ReleaseID=1307.  Some studies, however, have found that, if the public is asked about “af-
firmative action” and not about preferences or quotas, public support for diversity efforts is high.  See, 
e.g., S. Plous, Ten Myths About Affirmative Action, J. SOC. ISSUES, Winter 1996, at 25, 27 (reporting that 
a Time/CNN Poll found that 80% of the public supports some iteration of affirmative action); Melinda 
L. Shelton & Diane Minor, Poll Supports NOW’s Affirmative Action Position, NAT’L NOW TIMES 
(Nat’l Org. for Women, D.C.), May/June 1995, http://www.now.org/nnt/05-95/poll.html (citing poll 
conducted by the Peter Y. Harris Research Group from March 16 to April 3, 1995, and explaining that 
those polled supported a referendum that would prohibit the consideration of race, gender, and other 
characteristics in a state’s operation of its public employment, education, and contracting and that sup-
port for the referendum declined when the participants were told that it would eliminate affirmative ac-
tion programs for women and minorities). 
111  See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in Nomi-
nating Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court (May 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nominating-judge-sonia-sotomayor-united-
states-supreme-court (explaining that experiences and empathy, rather than particular identity markers, 
were what made Justice Sotomayor an ideal Supreme Court appointee). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 610 
who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it’s like to be a young 
teenage mom, the empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor or Afri-
can-American or gay or disabled or old—and that’s the criterion by which 
I’ll be selecting my judges.”112  President Obama has suggested that mem-
bers of marginalized groups are likely to have struggled in life, making 
them better situated to understand the plights of diverse citizens who come 
before the courts.113  In praising Justice Sotomayor’s qualifications for the 
Supreme Court, President Obama emphasized her experience with hardship 
but did not stress her ethnicity or gender.  He noted that she had 
[e]xperience being tested by obstacles and barriers, by hardship and misfor-
tune; experience insisting, persisting, and ultimately overcoming those bar-
riers.  It is experience that can give a person a common touch and a sense of 
compassion; an understanding of how the world works and how ordinary 
people live.  And that is why it is a necessary ingredient in the kind of justice 
we need on the Supreme Court.114 
By shifting the focus away from identity politics and toward a neutral stan-
dard of empathy, President Obama perhaps hopes to avoid conservative ob-
jections to his diversity strategy.  President Obama’s approach to judicial 
selection may be gaining traction with the American public; a recent study 
found that 68% of the public believes that a judge’s ability to “empathize 
with ordinary people” is very important.115 
In practice, however, President Obama seems to be engaged in a strat-
egy to further diversify the bench using identity characteristics because of 
his belief that judges from marginalized groups are likely to possess a 
greater capacity for the empathy he finds so valuable on the bench.  His first 
two appointees to the Supreme Court are members of groups currently un-
derrepresented on the bench: Justice Sonia Sotomayor is a Hispanic female, 
and Justice Elena Kagan is a white female.  President Obama’s lower feder-
al court appointments follow the same pattern.116 
 
112  Edward Whelan, Obama’s Constitution: The Rhetoric and the Reality, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 
17, 2008), http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/849oyckg.asp. 
113  One white female judge I interviewed questioned Obama’s premise that empathy is critical to 
judging: “Does empathy play out?  Yes . . . .  [Y]ou have to say that you understand [the party’s posi-
tion] but in the end you must do what the law requires.  You don’t want judges who won’t apply the law 
because of empathy.”  Interview with Judge F, supra note 57. 
114  See Press Release, supra note 111. 
115  James L. Gibson, Expecting Justice and Hoping for Empathy, MILLER-MCCUNE (June 20, 
2010), http://www.miller-mccune.com/legal-affairs/expecting-justice-and-hoping-for-empathy-17677 
(showing public views in a chart entitled “The Characteristics Americans Prefer in Supreme Court Jus-
tices”). 
116  As of January 1, 2011, only 25.0% of President Obama’s confirmed appellate judges were white 
males.  In his first two years in office, Obama appointed five African-Americans (31.3% of all Obama 
appellate judge appointments), two Hispanics (12.5%), six women (37.5%), and one Asian-American 
(6.3%) to the courts of appeals.  At the district court level, 31.8% of Obama’s confirmed judges were not 
white males: eleven blacks (25.0% of all Obama district court appointees), two Hispanic (4.6%), twenty-
105:587  (2011) Diversifying the Federal Bench 
 611 
II. ARGUMENTS OPPOSING A DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 
Republican presidents must walk a fine line between satisfying their 
party’s conservative white male base, which strongly opposes any type of 
affirmative action plan, and appeasing certain identity groups whose politi-
cal support may be critical in future elections.  To balance these competing 
interests, Republican presidents beginning with President Reagan have pur-
sued a three-pronged strategy.117  First, they publicly oppose quotas and pre-
ferential-treatment affirmative action for minorities and women.118  Second, 
they decline to continue the system-wide diversity plans of their Democrat-
ic predecessors, instead advocating a “color-blind” approach to awarding 
government positions.119  Third, notwithstanding their public opposition to 
 
four women (54.6%), and five Asian-Americans (11.4%).  I obtained this data through the Federal Judi-
cial Center database, see History of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 3, by searching the categories 
“nominating president,” “court type,” “gender,” and “race or ethnicity.” 
117  As I argued in Part I, this stands in contrast to the three Democratic presidents starting with Pres-
ident Carter.  Though each agreed that the federal bench required increased diversity, there was no 
agreement between them as to the justification for diversity.  See supra Part I.  
118  For example, the 1984 Republican Party platform states, “Just as we must guarantee opportunity 
[for minorities and women], we oppose attempts to dictate results.  We will resist efforts to replace equal 
rights with discriminatory quota systems and preferential treatment.  Quotas are the most insidious form 
of discrimination: reverse discrimination against the innocent.” Republican Party Platforms: Republican 
Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1984), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=25845. 
119  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (showing that the Bush Administration advocated 
a color-blind admissions process for the University of Michigan’s law school); NICHOLAS LAHAM, THE 
REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 73 (1998) (indicating that Reagan was dedicated to 
achieving a “colorblind society” through “colorblind law”).  Many scholars have questioned whether a 
“color-blind” process is mandated by the Constitution.  See Chris K. Iijima, Swimming from the Island 
of the Colorblind: Deserting an Ill-Conceived Constitutional Metaphor, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 583, 591 
(1997); Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal Protection, the Second Deconstruction, 
and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 194–95 (1997); see also ANDREW KULL, THE 
COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992); CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO 
BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 67–87 (1997); JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE 
IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 28 (1996); Reva B. 
Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE 
AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 29 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998); David 
A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 100 (arguing that the discrimination 
prohibition in Brown v. Board of Education is not color-blind but rather “deeply race-conscious”). 
In keeping with this body of scholarship, some have argued that whites come into any selection 
process with a “[w]hite privilege”—the “pervasive, structural, and generally invisible assumption that 
white people define a norm and Black people are ‘other,’ dangerous, and inferior.”  Sylvia A. Law, 
White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 604 (1999) (footnote omitted).  “White 
skin privilege,” as Bridgette Baldwin has described it, thus creates a “social construction which creates a 
racial bureaucracy where whites exist at the top and African Americans are at the bottom.”  Bridgette 
Baldwin, Colorblind Diversity: The Changing Significance of “Race” in the Post-Bakke Era, 72 ALB. 
L. REV. 863, 874–75 (2009) (citing IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF RACE 163 (1996)).  Because of white skin privilege, a so-called color-blind process only perpetuates 
inequality between the races.  See id. at 873–76. 
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affirmative action, when selecting judges for the federal courts, Republican 
presidents in the post-Carter years all engage in the same sort of identity 
politics of which they accuse Democrats.120  However, while Democrats 
generally “score points” with their diversity appointments, Republican at-
tempts at diversity have been less fruitful.  For example, Republicans gar-
nered only 31% of the Hispanic vote in 2008,121 despite the fact that George 
W. Bush had appointed more Hispanics to the bench (thirty) than Clinton 
had (twenty-three).122 
During his 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan addressed the 
American Bar Association (ABA), stating that he would not choose judicial 
candidates on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender.123  Around the same 
time, however, Reagan promised the American public that he would ap-
point “the most qualified woman he could find” to become the first female 
Supreme Court Justice.124  He kept this campaign promise by appointing 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.125  Though well-respected in her home state 
of Arizona, few believed that Justice O’Connor was the most qualified 
woman, let alone the most qualified person, for the job.126  Despite Reagan’s 
attempts to win favor with female voters and an initially positive response 
to his appointment of Justice O’Connor, his approval ratings among women 
remained low throughout his presidency.127 
The most prominent diversity appointment during the presidency of 
George H.W. Bush was Justice Clarence Thomas, chosen to replace Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, the first African-American to sit on the Court.  Presi-
dent Bush proclaimed that he chose Justice Thomas not because he was 
African-American but because he was the “best person” for the job.128  Jus-
tice Thomas, however, was accused by many of lacking the intellectual ca-
 
120  See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 4, at 21–27 (explaining the theory of elite mobilization pursuant 
to which politicians engage in tactics surrounding judicial appointments, including particular diversity 
appointments, primarily for the sake of currying favor with an elite constituency of their respective par-
ties). 
121  See Mark Hugo Lopez, How Hispanics Voted in the 2008 Election, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 7, 
2008), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1024/exit-poll-analysis-hispanics. 
122  I obtained this data through the Federal Judicial Center database, see History of the Federal Ju-
diciary, supra note 3, by searching by appointing president and by Hispanic race or ethnicity. 
123  Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in Atlanta, Georgia, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1110, 1112 (Aug. 1, 1983) (“[W]e . . . will never select individuals just because they are men or 
women, whites or blacks, Jews, Catholics, or whatever.  I don’t look at people as members of groups; I 
look at them as individuals and as Americans.”). 
124  THE REAGAN YEARS: THE RECORD IN PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 147 (Joseph Hogan ed., 
1990). 
125  Lou Cannon, Reagan Names Woman to Supreme Court, WASH. POST, July 8, 1981, at A1. 
126  See GOLDMAN, supra note 12, at 329. 
127  See Judy Mann, Gender Gap, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1983, at B1. 
128  John E. Yang & Sharon LaFraniere, Bush Picks Thomas for Supreme Court, WASH. POST, July 
2, 1991, at A1. 
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pacity to sit on the Supreme Court, belying the President’s claim.129  More-
over, this appointment by President George H.W. Bush failed to improve 
the Republican Party’s standing with black voters.130 
Later, President George W. Bush tried to build his party’s standing 
with female voters through judicial appointments, but his efforts also failed.  
When Justice O’Connor announced her retirement, President George W. 
Bush nominated another woman, Harriet Miers, to fill her seat.131  This time, 
it was conservatives, not liberals, who protested that the nominee was un-
qualified for the position,132 causing Miers to withdraw her nomination.133  
Although 22.1% of President George W. Bush’s judicial appointees were 
women,134 female voters continued to favor Democrats in both the 2004 and 
2008 presidential elections.135  In 2004, women supported John Kerry more 
 
129  See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, Cautious Thomas Plays Hearing by the Script, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 13, 1991, at 3 (“The fact is, Clarence Thomas is a hard worker, but he’s not an erudite 
scholar.” (quoting Bruce Fein) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sam Stein, Obama: I Would Not 
Have Nominated Clarence Thomas, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2008, 8:46 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/08/16/obama-i-would-not-have-no_n_119366.html (“I don’t think 
that [Thomas] was a strong enough jurist or legal thinker at the time for that elevation.” (quoting then-
Senator Barack Obama)); Editorial, Thomas ‘Qualified’ The President’s Rejoicing over This Lackluster 
Endorsement Reveals the Cynicism of a Choice Based on Not Credential and Experience but Politics 
and Race, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Aug. 29, 1991, at A12, available at LexisNexis (“Now the ABA 
has come up with a luke-warm split decision [of qualified versus unqualified] that at the very least 
punches holes in the Bush contention he picked the best man for the job.  It is ever more apparent his 
nominee was named primarily because he’s a black conservative, not because he’ll bring anything close 
to a superior intellect or significant judicial experience to the bench.”). 
130  Blacks were looking not only for a descriptive representative to replace Justice Marshall but also 
for a substantive one.  See Thomas B. Edsall, Politics and the Thomas Choice: Building the GOP’s 
Black Elite, WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at A7 (“[T]he Thomas nomination ‘appears to be yet another 
step in the ideological hijacking of the Supreme Court by the radical right wing of the Republican par-
ty.’” (quoting Democratic National Chairman, Ronald H. Brown)). 
131  Michael A. Fletcher, White House Counsel Miers Chosen for Court: Some Question Her Lack of 
Experience as a Judge, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1. 
132  See Charles Babington & Thomas B. Edsall, Conservative Republicans Divided over Nominee, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at A11; Peter Baker & Dan Balz, Conservatives Confront Bush Aides; Anger 
Over Nomination of Miers Boils Over During Private Meetings, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2005, at A1; 
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Some Liberals and Conservatives Find Themselves in Awkward Spots, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at A23. 
133  See Robin Toner, David D. Kirkpatrick & Anne E. Kornblut, Steady Erosion in Support Under-
cut Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16. 
134  George W. Bush appointed the greatest percentage of women of any Republican president to 
date.  His two Republican predecessors, George H.W. Bush and Reagan, appointed only 19.3% and 
8.1% women, respectively.  I obtained this data through the Federal Judicial Center database, see Histo-
ry of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 3, by searching for all women judges appointed by each of these 
presidents and for the total number of appointments made by each president. 
135  See Lisa Bennett, Women Voters Maintain Gender Gap in 2004 Elections, NAT’L ORG. FOR 
WOMEN (Nov. 12, 2004), http://www.now.org/issues/election/elections2004/041112womensvote.html; 
Data Points: Gender Gap in the 2008 Election, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 6, 2008), http://
politics.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2008/11/06/data-points-gender-gap-in-the-2008-election.html. 
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than men did because women more strongly, and in greater numbers, op-
posed the war in Iraq.136 
President George W. Bush also sought to shore up support with His-
panic voters through court appointments.  Among his first group of appel-
late court nominees was Miguel Estrada, nominated to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.137  If confirmed, Estrada 
would have been a frontrunner to become the first Hispanic Supreme Court 
Justice.138  Keeping in mind Estrada’s compelling personal narrative as an 
immigrant who overcame poverty to eventually graduate from Harvard Law 
School, Democrats in the Senate hoped to avoid giving President George 
W. Bush and the Republicans an electoral opportunity with Hispanic voters 
by confirming Estrada.139  After Democrats stalled his nomination for more 
than two years, Estrada withdrew his nomination.140 
The Bush Administration did not restrict its diversity efforts only to the 
Supreme Court and the appellate courts.  In fact, one judge I interviewed 
told me that the Administration made efforts to find diversity candidates for 
the bench in his jurisdiction.  When soliciting names for district court nom-
inations from this judge before he was appointed to the court, the Adminis-
tration instructed this judge “to start with minority and women 
candidates.”141 
Despite their hard-line opposition to affirmative action, Republican 
presidents have engaged in identity politics, using the judicial appointment 
process to further party efforts to win over certain groups of voters.  How-
ever, when Democrats are in the White House, Republicans often maintain 
that race, ethnicity, and gender should play no role in government appoint-
ments, including the selection of judges.  In this Part, I address each of their 
arguments against a diversity strategy for the federal bench. 
A. Stigmatization 
Political theorists have long debated the place of shame and stigma in a 
democratic polity.142  According to this body of scholarship, a democratic 
government, like a tyrannical government, can engage in “politics of 
 
136  See Susan Carroll, Women Voters and the Gender Gap, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, 
http://www.apsanet.org/content_5270.cfm (last visited Aug. 18, 2011). 
137  Amy Goldstein, Bush Will Nominate 11 as U.S. Judges, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at A1. 
138  Charles Lane, Nominee for Court Faces Two Battles, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at A1. 
139  See id. 
140  Neil A. Lewis, Stymied by Democrats in Senate, Bush Court Pick Finally Gives Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 2003, at A1. 
141  Interview with Judge P, supra note 108.  I have no evidence of whether other recommenders 
were given the same instructions. 
142  See, e.g., Christina Tarnopolsky, Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato and the Contemporary 
Politics of Shame, 32 POL. THEORY 468, 469 (2004) (referencing several historical theories about shame 
in politics and positing a new theory about the “place of shame in democratic politics”). 
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shame.”143  Shaming occurs when the ruling class singles out a group and 
treats it as the “other” because it poses a threat to prevailing social norms.144  
At certain times in our history, both minorities and women have been 
shamed by the white male ruling class.  In essence, shaming is a form of 
discrimination. 
Prominent conservatives, however, have turned the tables on the poli-
tics of shame.  Today, when the government affirmatively engages in ef-
forts to increase the presence of minorities and women in government 
institutions, conservatives maintain that the government is further shaming 
and stigmatizing these groups.145  Perhaps the most prominent judicial scho-
lar espousing this position is Justice Thomas, the only African-American 
currently on the Court: 
[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended conse-
quences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimina-
tion.  So-called “benign” discrimination teaches many that because of chronic 
and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them 
without their patronizing indulgence. . . .  These [affirmative action] programs 
stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority . . . .146 
Conservatives claim that those who are most injured by affirmative ac-
tion programs are well-qualified appointees who nonetheless are stamped 
with a “badge of inferiority.”  Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Grutter v. 
Bollinger poignantly expresses this view: 
When blacks take positions in the highest places of government, industry, or 
academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part in 
their advancement.  The question itself is the stigma—because either racial 
discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed “oth-
 
143  See id. at 469–70. 
144  Id. at 470. 
145  See, e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND 
JUSTICE 9 (1996); CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 74–75 (2007) (describing 
his anger at realizing that his admission to Yale Law School and his successes there were perceived by 
whites as tainted or unmerited); Rush Limbaugh Show, Meritocracy and the Obamas (radio broadcast 
Oct. 12, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_101210/content/
01125113.guest.html) (“Affirmative action was a lowering of standards.  This is why people really 
didn’t want to be considered affirmative action babies ’cause it was a stigma.  You didn’t get there on 
merit if affirmative action got you there.  You got there because the way was paved for you.”).  For an 
argument that color-blind approaches do the same, see SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR 
CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 7–9 (1990) (offering the perspective that Reagan’s 
declaration of his own color-blindness in political selections merely laid the groundwork of innocence 
necessary to facilitate his use of “government power against black power”). 
146  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring the judgment); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.  Unless they are 
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a 
politics of racial hostility.”). 
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erwise unqualified,” or it did not, in which case asking the question itself un-
fairly marks those blacks who would succeed without discrimination.147 
There is some empirical evidence in support of Thomas’s assertion in Grut-
ter.  Studies show that whites assume whites to be qualified for a particular 
job, but they perceive that equally qualified minorities are unqualified for 
the same position; the studies indicate that whites assume that minority 
hires were awarded their jobs through diversity plans.148  One federal judge 
believes that “a significant portion of the white population . . . if they went 
to two service providers [one a minority, one white] in any subcategory—
for example, medicine, law—would say that the service provider [who] 
was . . . a minority . . . would provide inferior service.”149  He also recalled 
the striking reaction of whites to the news that he, an Ivy League-educated 
minority, was a federal court judge: “[T]hey almost invariably ask me, 
‘[W]here did you go to school?’  That’s the first question.  Instead of react-
ing, ‘[W]ow, that’s really cool.  You’re a judge.  I don’t know any judges.  
In fact, I’ve never met a federal judge.  What do you do?’”150 
Two judges I interviewed agreed with the claim that diversity pro-
grams stigmatize minorities.  One of them, a white female judge, echoed the 
sentiment of Justice Thomas that diversity initiatives potentially hurt quali-
fied minorities: “[T]here is an unspoken perception that the minority ap-
pointee had lower qualifications and was pushed through even when it is 
not true.”151  Another white female judge concurred that a stigma attaches to 
qualified minorities when a diversity program is in place.152  She also noted 
that white males sometimes face the same problem as diversity appointees, 
particularly when appointed because of political connections: 
I think there is always that risk.  When your criteria are not who [are] the best 
qualified but something else . . . .  I think you make these appointments [sub-
ject to] questions about competency.  It is up to the person to prove his or her 
competency . . . .  I think white males have a different issue on how they got 
 
147  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also Glenn C. Loury, Performing Without a Net, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 49, 53 
(George E. Curry ed., 1996) (“I am convinced that the long-term interests of African-Americans will be 
helped, not harmed, by a rational reassessment and reform of current preferential policies.”). 
148  See Rupert Barnes Nacoste, Sources of Stigma: Analyzing the Psychology of Affirmative Action, 
12 LAW & POL’Y 175, 178–79 (1990); Russel J. Summers, The Influence of Affirmative Action on Per-
ceptions of a Beneficiary’s Qualifications, 21 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1265, 1272–73 (1991).  Although 
most affirmative action efforts sought qualified women for jobs as well as minorities, most of the litera-
ture seems centered on minorities.  One observer has noted that Sarah Palin seems to suffer from the 
same stigma with which Justice Thomas believes he is afflicted.  See Dahlia Lithwick, From Clarence 
Thomas to Palin, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, at 14. 
149  Interview with Judge M, supra note 58.  This same judge does not think that women are still 
stigmatized by a diversity strategy as they might have been in the past.  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  Interview with Judge N, supra note 100. 
152  Interview with Judge F, supra note 57. 
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there.  If they are the cousin of “X” or gave a large campaign contribution, 
people in the know are going to say “[H]mmm . . . that’s interesting.”  I don’t 
think [being] white and male exempts you from prov[ing] competency.153 
All other judges interviewed (male and female, minority and white) dis-
avowed the principle that diversity initiatives stigmatize judges who are ap-
pointed under such policies. 
B. Less Qualified Judges 
Ever since a diversity strategy was first implemented, conservatives 
have warned that the overall quality of the federal bench would suffer.154  In 
contrast to the argument that qualified minorities and women are stigma-
tized because people incorrectly assume they are not qualified, conserva-
tives have often claimed that specific diversity nominees are, in fact, not 
qualified.155  They have argued that since race, gender, and ethnicity have 
become factors in the appointment process, merit is no longer the standard 
for choosing federal judges: 
The precepts of merit selection dictate that only those possessing the most illu-
strious credentials will be recommended, without regard to political considera-
tions.  However, it is claimed, affirmative action is, by its nature, a political 
 
153  Id. 
154  For example, during the Carter Administration, a conservative Republican senator’s aide re-
marked, “Race or sex has nothing to do with it.  Carter has gone too far in trying to impose quotas.  The 
whole approach is off base . . . .  We like the principle of merit selection. We applaud that . . . .  Yet are 
they doing that?”  Eliot Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection: Will They Affect the Senate’s Role? 
(Part II), 64 JUDICATURE 114, 117 (1980) (second alteration in original).  Since Justice O’Connor’s re-
tirement, conservatives have attacked every single female nominee to the Court as unqualified.  For ma-
nifestations of these attacks, see infra notes 155, 159–60. 
155  Many conservatives made such comments about nominee Harriet Miers.  See Patrick J. Bucha-
nan, Miers’ Qualifications Are ‘Non-existent,’ HUMAN EVENTS (Oct. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=9444 (“[H]er qualifications for the Supreme Court are 
non-existent.  She is not a brilliant jurist, indeed, has never been a judge.  She is not a scholar of the 
law.  Researchers are hard-pressed to dig up an opinion.  She has not had a brilliant career in politics, the 
academy, the corporate world or public forum.  Were she not a friend of Bush, and female, she would 
never have even been considered.”); Ann Coulter, Does This Law Degree Make My Resume Look Fat?, 
ANNCOULTER.COM (Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.anncoulter.com/cgi-local/article.cgi?article=80 (“The 
only sexism involved in the Miers nomination is the administration’s claim that once they decided they 
wanted a woman, Miers was the best they could do.  Let me just say, if the top male lawyer in the coun-
try is John Roberts and the top female lawyer is Harriet Miers, we may as well stop allowing girls to go 
to law school.”); Tom Curry, Some Conservatives Not Thrilled by Miers, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 4, 2005, 
11:53 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9536142/ns/us_news-the_changing_court (quoting Manuel 
Miranda, a conservative strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, as saying that 
“[t]he reaction of many conservatives today will be that the president has made possibly the most unqua-
lified choice since Abe Fortas . . . .  The nomination of a nominee with no judicial record is a significant 
failure for the advisers that the White House gathered around it.”).  On Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia 
Sotomayor, see infra notes 159–60. 
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goal, and one which directly contravenes the very thrust of merit selection.  It 
submerges quality in order to redress past race and sex discrimination.156 
Misconceptions about qualifications continue to plague diversity can-
didates.  During the confirmation process for Justice Sotomayor, several 
high-profile conservative pundits accused her of being unqualified to be a 
Supreme Court Justice, notwithstanding her Yale Law School degree and 
her judicial experience as a district court and court of appeals judge.157  For 
instance, according to Patrick Buchanan, “No one ha[d] brought forth the 
slightest evidence she ha[d] the intellectual candlepower to sit on the Ro-
berts court.”158  Similarly, Michael Savage stated that Justice Sotomayor “is 
as qualified to be a Supreme Court justice as . . . an ordinary lawyer in your 
town.”159  Elena Kagan was similarly attacked.160 
Several empirical studies have tested the hypothesis that diversity ap-
pointees to the bench are less qualified than their white male peers.161  One 
 
156  BERKSON & CARBON, supra note 19, at 4 (footnote omitted).  However, the judicial appointment 
process has never been based strictly on merit.  Beginning with President Washington, presidents have 
always chosen judges from their own party, and in recent years, from their own ideological wing of the 
party.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 26 (2005) (“[T]he simple reality is that both the Senate and the president take into ac-
count nominees’ partisanship and ideology, in addition to their professional qualifications, when they 
make their decisions, and they always have.”); SCHERER, supra note 4, at 65–73.  Moreover, when pa-
tronage appointments ruled the day for lower courts, judges were chosen through the “‘old boys’ net-
work” and had some kind of personal or political relationship with the home state senator.  See 
SCHERER, supra note 4, at 77. 
157  See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Videos Reveal Sotomayor’s Positions on Affirmative Action and Other 
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at A17. 
158  Patrick J. Buchanan, Miss Affirmative Action, 2009, WORLDNETDAILY (June 12, 2009, 1:00 
AM), http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=100835. 
159  Sonia Sotomayor Is NOT Qualified for Supreme Court, SAVAGE NATION at 4:49 (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l8OJh2PVfa4 (“And I don’t even think she could’ve passed law 
school without affirmative action.”); cf. supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing attacks on 
Clarence Thomas’s qualifications). 
160  See Ed Whelan, Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 10, 2010, 
5:51 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/199171/supreme-court-nominee-elena-kagan/ed-
whelan (“Kagan may well have less experience relevant to the work of being a justice than any justice in 
the last five decades or more.  In addition to zero judicial experience, she has only a few years of real-
world legal experience.  Further, notwithstanding all her years in academia, she has only a scant record 
of legal scholarship.  Kagan flunks her own ‘threshold’ test of the minimal qualifications needed for a 
Supreme Court nominee.”); Andrea Mitchell Reports (MSNBC television broadcast May 11, 2010), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eGqTpasrnzE (interviewing Senator John Cornyn who 
opined that Miers “had eminently more experience” than Kagan). 
161  See, e.g., Susan Brodie Haire, Rating the Ratings of the American Bar Association Standing 
Committee on Federal Judiciary, JUST. SYS. J., Jan. 2001, at 1, 15; James Lindgren, Examining the 
American Bar Association’s Ratings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 
1989-2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1, 25 (2001); Slotnick, supra note 14, at 284–86; Richard L. Vining, Amy 
Steigerwalt & Susan Navarro Smelcer, Bias and the Bar: Evaluating the ABA Ratings of Federal Judi-
cial Nominees, POL. RES. Q. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author).  In each article cited above, there 
is a model containing a control variable for race.  Negative values for race mean that blacks receive low-
er ABA ratings (a metric for quality) than do whites. 
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early study on President Carter’s appointees found that when quality was 
measured as graduation from an elite law school, there was no aggregate 
difference between minority and female judges (treated as a single group) 
and white male judges.162  When the ABA ratings were used to measure the 
judges’ qualifications, minorities and women were found to be less quali-
fied than white male judges.163  This result was thought to be driven by the 
fact the ABA considers years of legal experience in its rankings.164  Because 
of historic barriers to law school entry facing women and minorities and the 
subsequent difficulty obtaining jobs, President Carter’s nominees rarely had 
the fifteen years of legal experience the ABA decided made nominees well 
qualified for the bench.165  Thus, historical discrimination led to minorities 
and women receiving lower ABA ratings than white men. 
Three more recent examinations of quality measured by ABA ratings 
have examined, among other things, whether minorities and women tend to 
receive lower qualifications ratings than whites and males.166  Two of the 
studies found no statistically significant difference (at p < 0.05) between the 
ABA scores of minority versus white judges, and one found no statistically 
significant difference for female versus male judges, all at the appellate lev-
el.167 
None of the minority judges interviewed believed that the quality of 
the courts suffers by pursuing a diversity appointment strategy.  These 
judges presumed that all minorities chosen for the federal bench were as 
qualified as whites on the bench.  Most white judges, male and female, 
agreed with their minority peers by dismissing the notion that diversity ap-
pointees are less qualified than white males.  One white male judge ob-
served, “The people that I see coming on the bench, especially at the caliber 
 
162  See Slotnick, supra note 15, at 285.  However, when minorities and women were disaggregated, 
minorities were more likely to have attended less elite law schools than whites; there was still no differ-
ence between men and women.  See id. at 286.  More recently, I used my own data on Carter and Clin-
ton nominees and found no meaningful difference in the qualifications of blacks or women versus white 
male judges, using graduation from elite law schools to measure qualifications.  (Data on file with au-
thor). 
163  See Slotnick, supra note 15, at 295–96. 
164  See Vining, Steigerwalt & Smelcer, supra note 161, at 3. 
165  See id. at 2 & n.3. 
166  See Haire, supra note 161, at 15 (finding that minority and female nominees received lower 
ABA ratings even after controlling for other factors of judicial qualification, suggesting that the ratings 
are not good measures of quality); Lindgren, supra note 161, at 25 tbl.6; Vining, Steigerwalt & Smelcer, 
supra note 161, at 3–18. 
167  See Lindgren, supra note 161, at 25 tbl.6 (showing that few characteristics other than nominating 
president and judicial experience affected ABA ratings); Bias and the Bar: Evaluating the ABA Ratings 
of Federal Judicial Nominees, supra note 161, at 17, 29 tbl.1 (finding no statistical difference at the 
p < 0.05 level for race but finding that men were 12.3% more likely to receive a “well-qualified” rating 
than women). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 620 
of the federal bench, merely because they are . . . a minority or a fe-
male, . . . aren’t any less qualified.”168 
Some of the white judges, however, tempered their responses by em-
phasizing that “qualifications” must be considered first and foremost before 
considering diversity.  These judges were worried that the legitimacy of the 
federal courts would suffer if unqualified minority candidates were selected.  
For example, a white female judge stated: “There are some people who are 
chosen for diversity and not qualifications, but that actually diminishes the 
public’s trust of the courts.”169  A similar sentiment was echoed by another 
white female judge concerning the judicial appointment process: “[I]n striv-
ing for diversity you have to be careful not to dilute the quality.  I don’t 
think we should engage in real affirmative action.  It is unfair to our public 
if we can’t service them.”170 
One white female judge was troubled that the appointment of unquali-
fied diversity candidates would lead to white male backlash, further under-
mining legitimacy: 
If someone is chosen simply to create diversity and they are not as good or up 
to the task, everyone else figures it out in short order, and it could cause re-
sentment.  I don’t think that is good for society.  I start on the assumption that 
minorities are not immutably unqualified.171 
In sum, while none of the judges believed their minority and female col-
leagues on the bench to be unqualified, some did intimate that a diversity 
program for the federal courts could theoretically produce unqualified 
judges were race, ethnicity, and gender to be given greater weight than a 
candidate’s qualifications. 
C. Reverse Discrimination 
Conservatives also decry diversity programs because they constitute 
reverse discrimination.172  Justice Thomas has warned that these perceptions 
of reverse discrimination lead to white backlash173: “[S]uch programs . . . 
 
168  Interview with Judge G, supra note 73. 
169  Interview with Judge S (July 27, 2009). 
170  Interview with Judge O, supra note 82. 
171  Interview with Judge A, supra note 43. 
172  See infra notes 176–82 and accompanying text. 
173  Most attribute this backlash to feelings among whites that their once-privileged status of supe-
riority is jeopardized by minorities.  See, e.g., HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., TOWARD A THEORY OF 
MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 154 (1967) (“An increase in minority percentage should result in an in-
crease in discrimination both because of heightened perceived competition and an increased power 
threat.”).  Others argue it is a product of racism.  See, e.g., FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 
12 (Charles Lam Markmann trans., 1967) (“There is a fact: White men consider themselves superior to 
black men.”). 
President Obama has also recognized the existence of white backlash resulting from opposition to 
racial policies; he believes it stems from whites’ feelings that they are being punished for the wrong-
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provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged 
by the government’s use of race.”174  According to Gregory Rodriguez of 
the New America Foundation, white backlash 
won’t take the form of a chest-thumping brand of white supremacy.  Instead, 
we are likely to see the rise of a more defensive, aggrieved sense of white vic-
timhood . . . .  [O]ne can hear evidence of white grievance in many corners of 
the country.  And it’s not coming just from fringe bloggers. . . .  [E]ven though 
[whites] are still the majority and collectively maintain more access to wealth 
and political influence than other groups, whites are acting more and more like 
an aggrieved minority.175 
White backlash to liberal racial policies was first detected at the same 
time that affirmative action programs began to take hold in the early 
1970s.176  Cases involving legal claims of reverse discrimination, such as 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,177 DeFunis v. Odegaard,178 
J. A. Croson,179 Adarand,180 Grutter,181 Parents Involved,182 and Hopwood v. 
 
doing of their ancestors through affirmative action programs that give preference to minorities.  See Ba-
rack Obama, A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008) (speech delivered at the National Constitution Cen-
ter) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88478467). 
Still others suggest that white backlash might be caused by the perception that government benefits 
are being awarded according to group membership, which is contrary to American individualism and 
meritocracy.  See, e.g., SKRENTNY, supra note 119, at 26–27. 
174  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that race preferences “contribut[e] to an escalation of racial hostility 
and conflict”). 
175  Gregory Rodriguez, The White Anxiety Crisis, TIME, Mar. 11, 2010, at 7, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1971133_1971110_1971119-1,00.html.  The 
fringe blogger of whom Rodriguez spoke was Glenn Beck, who “suggested that the white man responsi-
ble for the worst workplace massacre in Alabama history was ‘pushed to the wall’ because he felt ‘si-
lenced’ and ‘disenfranchised’ by ‘political correctness.’”  Id.  For an account of contemporary white 
nationalist groups, see SWAIN, supra note 79, at 339–45. 
176  See SWAIN, supra note 79, at 150. 
177  438 U.S. 265, 269–70, 276 (1978) (holding that a state medical school’s race-based selection of 
applicants, excluding white candidates from consideration for a reserved number of “special admis-
sions” slots, was unconstitutional). 
178  416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam) (considering a white applicant’s challenge to the constitutio-
nality of a state law school’s preferential treatment of minority candidates in admissions decisions and 
finding that the case was moot since the applicant, having been admitted after a state supreme court de-
cision in his favor, was completing his final term of law school). 
179  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487, 507–08 (1989) (holding that a city or-
dinance requiring city contractors to subcontract a set percentage of each job to minority businesses was 
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
180  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v, Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204–05 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals 
with instructions to apply a strict scrutiny standard where a contractor challenged the constitutionality of 
a federal statute giving monetary incentives to federal government contractors to hire minority-
controlled subcontractors). 
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Texas,183 are said to be borne of white backlash to affirmative action.184  
White flight from the Democratic Party is also cited as a manifestation of 
white backlash against liberal racial policies.185  More recently, there has 
been evidence that the Tea Party is rooted in white voters’ disapproval of 
the government’s civil rights agenda.186  However, although conservatives 
object to diversity efforts as reverse discrimination, some argue that the Re-
publican Party, rather than trying to prevent white backlash, instead tries to 
exploit it for electoral gain.187 
Does a judicial appointment strategy predicated on diversity, like di-
versity initiatives in other contexts, lead to white or male backlash?  For 
those judges interviewed who did offer opinions, the responses varied.  
Some judges seemed outraged by this suggestion.  A white female judge re-
sponded: “No.  I don’t think that [diversity efforts will cause a backlash] 
and I don’t care [if it does].”188  Referring to white males, she stated, “Let 
them be alienated.”189  Another female judge expressed her frustration this 
way: “[W]hite males are alive and well and thriving [on the federal bench].  
I don’t think anyone could say that the white male is getting the shaft [in the 
appointment process].”190  Similarly, one white male judge matter-of-factly 
 
181  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (upholding a state university law school’s admis-
sions standard that permitted the consideration of diversity benefits when evaluating applicants against a 
white applicant’s challenge that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
182  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–11 (2007) (over-
turning the assignment plans of two school districts that sought to achieve racial diversity by assigning 
students to elementary schools based on a series of factors including race). 
183  78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that the desire to achieve a more diverse student body does 
not make affirmative action plans constitutional). 
184  See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, American Democracy and Higher Education for Black Americans: The 
Lingering-Effects Theory, 7 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 59 (2005) (describing white backlash in re-
sponse to Hopwood); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of 
the Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REV. 150, 263–64 (1999) (describing white backlash in re-
sponse to Adarand and J.A. Croson); Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on Historical Con-
text and Vision, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1457 (2003) (characterizing DeFunis and Bakke as early white 
backlash cases). 
185  See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE 
NATION, INDIVISIBLE 171–77 (1997). 
186  See, e.g., Nicholas Graham, “Tea Party” Leader Melts Down on CNN: Obama Is an “Indone-
sian Muslim Turned Welfare Thug,” HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2009, 9:02 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/15/tea-party-leader-melts-do_n_286933.html (describing an 
interview with Tea Party leader Mark Williams and his references to President Obama as an “Indonesian 
Muslim turned welfare thug” and “a racist in chief” as well as his response that “[u]ntil [President Ob-
ama] embraces the whole country what else can I conclude”). 
187  See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at A23 (describ-
ing how President Reagan politically exploited white backlash in response to the civil rights movement). 
188  Interview with Judge Q, supra note 82. 
189  Id. 
190  Interview with Judge F, supra note 57. 
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stated that white or male backlash was unlikely to occur: “I think it would 
be pretty difficult because when you look around . . . the majority [of 
judges] is still white men.”191 
Many of the judges, on the other hand, speculated that diversity pro-
grams for the federal bench could cause white backlash.192  One judge, a 
minority woman, referenced the fight about identity politics that raged dur-
ing Justice Sotomayor’s confirmation proceedings: “I think the Sotomayor 
hearings illustrated the tension that seems to exist between the historically 
dominant subjects of our population and those who have been historically 
excluded from the bench.”193  Another judge, a white male, made these 
comments about diversity programs: 
A white middle class or even a white working class person, who feels that they 
are not obtaining what they should obtain on the merits because of affirmative 
action . . . is going to feel a resentment that is not without justification. . . .  I 
mean, it’s all well and good to say to that person, “[W]ell, this is for the great-
er good of society,” but he is going to say, “[W]ell, it’s my life, you know.”194 
One minority male judge believes that white backlash is borne of rac-
ism; when asked why white males view diversity as a threat, he replied: 
Because I think they are hiding under, dare I say . . . a cloak of racism.  Rac-
ism and gender bias.  It’s a question of people having been used to the way 
[the bench] was, for most of the critics are [in] the majority. . . .  I’ve met a 
judge [who said to me], “It’s about time a white guy got nominated.”  And I 
had to remind this person, who I think very highly of, [that] “this court was 
founded back in the 1700s and I think that, until recently, the court had only 
three to four nonwhite males as judges.”195 
Another white female judge disagreed that backlash is driven by rac-
ism, stating that she knew many people, “including some who have been on 
the wrong end of identity politics in the appointment process, who are any-
thing but prejudiced.  But they do resent being on the wrong end of identity 
politics.”196  She concluded, “I don’t think you should discriminate against 
white males to increase diversity.”197 
Finally, a minority male judge expressed the hopeful view that white 
backlash would end within a generation: 
 
191  Interview with Judge G, supra note 73. 
192  E.g., Interview with Judge A, supra note 43 (“[I]t could cause resentment.”); Interview with 
Judge F, supra note 57 (responding to a question about the prospects of diversity leading to white or 
male backlash by saying, “Yes, I assume it would”); Interview with Judge P, supra note 108 (“I suppose 
there is some prospect of backlash.”). 
193  Interview with Judge C, supra note 45. 
194  Interview with Judge L, supra note 84. 
195  Interview with Judge B, supra note 44. 
196  Interview with Judge R, supra note 85. 
197  Id. 
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Some white men are going to have some negativity about diversity, but I also 
think that that is generational. . . .  People of my son’s generation don’t assume 
that when a black man gets a job, it’s because of some affirmative action poli-
cy.  Particularly when you look at the black men who are out there now . . . 
[like] Barack Obama.198 
 
 * * * 
 
As we have seen above, scholars, pundits, presidents, and judges from 
different ends of the political spectrum have advocated very different posi-
tions as to whether diversity appointments are beneficial to our judicial sys-
tem and society.  The arguments largely break along partisan and 
ideological lines.  The common belief is that as long as we remain a nation 
highly polarized on race issues, there is no point of agreement between the 
two sides of the diversity debate.  As one scholar has cautioned: 
One product of categorically rejecting colorblindness and likening it to racism 
is a debate that becomes polarized, with each side entrenched in its own posi-
tion, unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of opposing arguments.  The 
opposing camps do not talk to each other so much as they talk past each other.  
Lost is the opportunity for persuasion and the identification of common 
ground.  What this means as a practical matter for race and law scholars is that 
our [prodiversity] preaching may be well received by the choir, but will likely 
fail to convert the broader population.  One is unlikely to persuade people 
whose positions one has vilified as racist.199 
Trying to move past the hegemonic paradigm that has defined the con-
tours of the diversity debate since the 1970s, I argue that, in fact, people on 
both ends of the political continuum actually agree on one critical point re-
garding judicial appointments: a president’s judicial appointment strategy 
should strive to enhance and preserve the legitimacy of our judicial system.  
In the next Part, I explain how both advocates and opponents of diversity 
strategies in the judicial selection process conform to normative political 
theories about building institutional legitimacy.200 
 
198  Interview with Judge M, supra note 58.  Judge M also thinks that male backlash against female 
judges has come to an end with this current generation.  See id. 
199  Ralph Richard Banks, Beyond Colorblindness: Neo-racialism and the Future of Race and Law 
Scholarship, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 41, 52 (2009). 
200  It should be noted that, heretofore, prodiversity advocates have been much more explicit than the 
color-blind advocates about their theory’s potential to enhance the legitimacy of the courts.  Indeed, 
President Clinton unequivocally stated that, without diversity, “the judiciary . . . runs the risk of losing 
its legitimacy in the eyes of many Americans.”  Clinton, supra note 72, at 15.  However, we shall see 
that conservatives actually share the same legitimacy goal as progressives.  See infra Part III. 
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III. THE DIVERSITY DEBATE AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 
Political scientists often link “legitimacy” to a “‘reservoir’ of good 
will” upon which an institution can rely in the short term in the event it is-
sues unpopular decisions.201  Legitimacy is long-term, deep-seated support 
for an institution (also known as “diffuse support”) rather than short-term 
snapshots of an institution’s popularity (also known as “specific sup-
port”).202  Because an institution’s long-term survival is so dependent on this 
reservoir of good will, our democracy would be in great jeopardy were any 
key political institution to lose its legitimacy. 
As the only unelected branch of our federal government, the federal 
judiciary is more reliant on its reservoir of good will than the elected 
branches are; elections are said to replenish the legitimacy of the Executive 
and Legislative Branches.203  Moreover, as the only branch lacking purse or 
sword, the judiciary is more reliant on legitimacy to secure voluntary ob-
edience to its orders.204  Only by ensuring optimal levels of legitimacy for 
the federal judiciary can we preserve one of the basic tenets of American 
democracy: the rule of law. 
A. A Diversity Strategy Promotes Institutional Legitimacy 
1. Remedying Past Discrimination.—According to the theory of pro-
cedural justice, a person’s perception of the legitimacy of the courts turns 
not on the substance of the outcome but on the fairness of the judicial 
process.205  This theory has been subjected to rigorous empirical analysis, 
and scholars have consistently found that fair court procedures evincing re-
spect, kindness, and the opportunity to be heard lead to greater legitimacy 
for the justice system.206  Notably, all of the judges interviewed for this 
project expressed their commitment to the principle of procedural justice. 
 
201  See DAVID EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 124–26 (1965); Gregory A. Cal-
deira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
635, 636–37 (1992); Scherer & Curry, supra note 21, at 90 (citing EASTON, supra). 
202  See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 201, at 637–38. 
203  See id. at 635. 
204  Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil 
Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 443 (1992). 
205  John Thibaut and Laurens Walker originally coined the term “procedural justice” to describe the 
way in which litigants’ satisfaction with the resolution of their legal dispute is influenced by the fairness 
of the process rather than the substantive outcome of the dispute.  See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS 
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67–68 (1975). 
206  In a large body of scholarship, Tom Tyler and colleagues build on Thibaut and Walker’s work.  
Tyler and his colleagues demonstrate that procedural justice leads not only to satisfaction with the reso-
lution of a specific case but, much more broadly, to greater satisfaction and trust in the legal system as a 
whole.  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 106–07 (1990) (reviewing studies and con-
cluding that perceptions of procedural justice increase the legitimacy of and, in turn, obedience to the 
law); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of Their Courtroom Ex-
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The theory of procedural justice is directly related to the goal of reme-
dying past discrimination.  Were a court to find that minorities had been 
systematically discriminated against, a hollow remedy awarded the victims 
would certainly be viewed as unfair and, as such, would undermine the 
court’s legitimacy.207  Outsiders, not parties to the case, may also be af-
fected by the ruling and as a result view the judicial process as unfair, jeo-
pardizing the legitimacy not of just one court but of the entire system. 
2. Descriptive Representation.—Unlike procedural justice, descrip-
tive representation promotes legitimacy not by providing litigants with fair 
and open procedures but by creating the appearance that a particular go-
vernmental institution is open to those from all walks of life.  As Justice 
O’Connor wrote in Grutter v. Bollinger, “In order to cultivate a set of lead-
ers with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path 
to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every 
race and ethnicity.”208  Descriptive representation thus rests not on in-court 
judicial behavior but rather on the provision of a strong symbolic message 
 
perience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 69 (1984) (finding a correlation between the perception that a legal 
process was fair and satisfaction with the judicial system); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: 
Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128 
(1988) (finding that citizens define fairness of process largely based on the behavior of the police and 
judges). 
Procedural justice has also been found to enhance the legitimacy of other political institutions.  See, 
e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Procedures on the 
Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809, 818 & tbl.2 (1994) (finding that the legitimacy 
of congressional committees and the members on those committees is strongly influenced by percep-
tions about the fairness of the procedures used by the committees); Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & 
Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the 
Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 629, 630 (1989) (“Court experiences spill over to help de-
fine the individual’s stance toward government institutions and political life in general.” (quoting 
HERBERT JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT: THE CONSUMPTION OF GOVERNMENT RESOURCES 129 (1969)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
207  There is a body of legal scholarship addressing whether the federal courts’ use of broad equita-
ble remedies, including those that redress racial discrimination, enhances or undermines the legitimacy 
of the federal courts.  See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 19–21 (1977) 
(arguing that the courts’ use of broad equitable powers to resolve political issues extends the courts 
beyond their rightful jurisdiction and entangles them in otherwise political and social policies, thereby 
threatening to undermine their legitimacy); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 374, 380 (1982) (suggesting that judicial case management can also affect perspectives on the legi-
timacy of the courts).  This debate, however, is inapposite to the one discussed herein.  As the argument 
goes, the federal courts’ legitimacy is undermined when judges employ equitable remedies to resolve 
political questions that are not within the courts’ Article III jurisdiction.  In contrast, here I consider a 
sort of equitable remedy imposed by the President through a power squarely entrusted to him by both 
the Constitution and the Legislature: the President’s use of his power to nominate and appoint federal 
court judges with the advice and consent of the Senate.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 511, 513 (2006)) (establishing 
the lower federal courts).  Of course, since President Obama has not adopted this theory to justify diver-
sity on the bench, the argument is moot for now.  See supra Part I.C. 
208  539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003). 
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conveyed by the mere act of seating members of underrepresented groups 
on the bench.209 
3. Substantive Representation.—Substantive representation may also 
lead to greater legitimacy for the U.S. courts.  By garnering public support 
through its substantive decisions over a long period of time, an institution 
can fill its reservoir of good will to protect it in the event it one day makes 
an unpopular decision.210 
Maintaining legitimacy among minority groups—interest groups that 
represent the views of a minority of people and ethnic or racial minority 
groups—has always been a thorny issue for democratic governments be-
cause the voices of the majority can easily drown out those of the minority.  
James Madison feared such a situation as he drafted the Constitution: 
“[M]easures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and 
the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and 
overbearing majority.”211  When the voices of a minority group are not en-
gaged in an institution’s decisionmaking process, that institution may be 
perceived by those excluded as illegitimate.  Legal scholars have argued 
that substantive representation is a way to resolve this “tyranny of the ma-
jority” dilemma by ensuring that racial and ethnic minorities’ interests (as 
well as those of other marginalized groups) are at least considered in the 
decisionmaking process of any given institution.212 
 
209  See M. Stephen Weatherford, Mapping the Ties That Bind: Legitimacy, Representation, and 
Alienation, 44 W. POL. Q. 251, 251 (1991) (“[E]valuating a political system’s claim to legitimacy de-
pends on the presence of constitutional guarantees of access and equality, properties that can be compe-
tently judged by an outside observer.”). 
210  See, e.g., Anke Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court 
Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the Supreme 
Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 633, 651 (1998) (claiming that controversial substantive decisions of the Court 
do not significantly decrease the long-term public support for the institution); Jeffery J. Mondak, Institu-
tional Legitimacy, Policy Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court, 20 AM. POL. Q. 457, 471 (1992) (finding 
that issuing unpopular decisions harms the legitimacy of the Supreme Court); Jeffery J. Mondak, Subs-
tantive and Procedural Aspects of Supreme Court Decisions as Determinants of Institutional Approval, 
19 AM. POL. Q. 174, 183–85 (1991) (finding that “the substance of Supreme Court rulings can exert 
strong influence on subsequent evaluations of the Court”); Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smi-
they, The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1123 (1997) (“[T]he 
Court’s support is derived from ‘the total impressions made by the Court over a long period of time.’” 
(quoting Michael Petrick, The Supreme Court and Authority Acceptance, 21 W. POL. Q. 5, 11 (1968))); 
Joseph Tanenhaus & Walter F. Murphy, Patterns of Public Support for the Supreme Court: A Panel 
Study, 43 J. POL. 24, 29 (1981) (showing a strong correlation between support for individual substantive 
decisions and long-term diffuse support for the Court). 
211  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott, Foresman & 
Co. 1898). 
212  See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Be-
lieve? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 887 (2009) (“If 
the law has not only rejected [minorities’] view of social reality, but has refused even to permit the arti-
culation of it . . . , those who disagree lack any resources for understanding the law as theirs.”). 
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B. A Diversity Program Undermines Institutional Legitimacy 
The three core conservative arguments against affirmative action are 
directly tied to political legitimacy.213  In order to make this case, I must 
first extend conservatives’ more general arguments against affirmative ac-
tion specifically to the judicial appointment process.  Taking the conserva-
tive arguments against diversity initiatives at face value, a president’s use of 
a diversity strategy to select federal judges undermines the institutional le-
gitimacy of the federal courts in three distinct ways: (1) by stigmatizing di-
versity judges, thus creating the appearance that they are not qualified to sit 
on the federal bench; (2) by elevating considerations of race, ethnicity, and 
gender over merit, thus resulting in the appointment of unqualified judges; 
and (3) by discriminating against potential white male judicial candidates, 
thus causing a white or male backlash. 
1. Stigmatization.—The theory of stigmatization proposes that diver-
sity initiatives stigmatize those nominees who benefit from the programs, 
leading the white public to presume that such diversity appointees are un-
qualified.214  If it is true that minority appointees on the bench are branded 
by the white public as less qualified than they are, and women are characte-
rized by men as less qualified, then a diversity strategy could undermine 
whites’ or men’s trust and confidence in the judicial process. 
Given some whites’ misconceptions about diversity hires and appoin-
tees, one could imagine a scenario in which a white litigant appeared before 
a diversity appointee, lost his case, and then felt that he had not received his 
fair day in court because a judge whom he perceived as an unqualified di-
versity appointee decided his case.  Extending this litigant’s dissatisfaction 
to white litigants across the country, trust in the judicial process would de-
cline as the number of diversity appointees rises.  Moreover, if a decision 
made by a diversity judge in a high profile case were to contradict popular 
opinion, then the public might suffer the same loss of trust as actual liti-
 
213  Similarly, some scholars maintain that only a color-blind process promotes legitimacy and that a 
process intended to increase the presence of one race or gender undermines the entire process’s legiti-
macy.  See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
116 (1996) (explaining that if courts strike down race-based preferential hiring, color-blind class-based 
preferences will provide an alternative that favors minorities but does not stigmatize the poor, making 
such preferences more legitimate than race-based preferences).  Some have criticized this position as 
hypocritical.  See, e.g., Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Pro-
grams After Miller v. Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1289, 1307 
(1997) (arguing that color-blind class-based preferences are no more legitimate than race-based prefe-
rences urged by progressives).  Nonetheless, this theory is consistent with the normative argument that a 
liberal government’s attempt to engage in distributive justice is illegitimate because it amounts to coer-
cion.  See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 166–68 (1974) (suggesting that gov-
ernment attempts to engage in distributive justice (i.e., to redistribute resources among individuals and 
groups) are illegitimate because they are a form of coercion over the individual). 
214  See supra notes 147–56 and accompanying text. 
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gants appearing before the diversity judges.  In short, there would be a crisis 
of confidence in the judicial process. 
In sum, pursuant to the theory of procedural justice, the widespread 
perception that the judicial process is unfair jeopardizes the legitimacy of 
the entire legal system.  Building on the procedural justice body of empiri-
cal research, some scholars have also found that when the public perceives 
that a political institution is operating incompetently, levels of trust and 
confidence in that institution decrease.215  Under these conditions, conserva-
tives could argue that diversity appointments jeopardize legitimacy by 
creating the appearance of an unqualified, unfair bench. 
2. Less Qualified Judges.—Conservatives’ second theory presumes 
that judges appointed pursuant to a diversity strategy for the federal bench 
are, in fact and not just in perception, less qualified than white judicial ap-
pointees.216  For the same reasons that perceptions about minority judges’ 
qualifications undermine the legitimacy of the courts, so too would the real-
ity that minority judges are less qualified than their white peers undermine 
confidence and trust in the federal courts. 
3. Reverse Discrimination.—This argument is grounded in the notion 
that any consideration of race, ethnicity, or gender in awarding jobs and 
benefits amounts to racial discrimination against whites, men, or both.217  
Extending this theory to the judicial appointment process, conservatives 
could argue that a president’s consideration of these factors in choosing 
judges discriminates against white or male judicial candidates.  If one views 
diversity initiatives as discriminatory, then such programs would violate the 
sacrosanct principle of all modern liberal democracies—that discrimination 
by the government is an illegitimate act.218  A discriminatory appointment 
process would thus be an illegitimate process.  Moreover, even if such a 
 
215  See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ 
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 18 (2002); Gary Orren, Fall from Grace: The Pub-
lic’s Loss of Faith in Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT 77 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 
Philip D. Zelikow & David C. King eds., 1997) (concluding that government’s failure to live up to citi-
zens’ expectations—that is, their wants and anticipations—plays a large role in the public’s loss of satis-
faction with the government); supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text. 
216  See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.  A few conservatives have also claimed that 
blacks in the general population are genetically less intelligent than whites.  See, e.g., RICHARD J. 
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 288 (1994) (finding that whites have higher IQs 
than blacks).  This theory has largely been rejected by mainstream scholars.  See, e.g., MARGARET L. 
ANDERSEN & HOWARD F. TAYLOR, SOCIOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING A DIVERSE SOCIETY 433–34 (4th ed. 
2006) (arguing that The Bell Curve uses faulty methodology); THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, 
INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (Steven Fraser ed., 1995) (offering a collection of essays 
dedicated to discussing and primarily discrediting The Bell Curve). 
217  See supra notes 173–86 and accompanying text. 
218  See John Gardner, Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 
(1989) (describing the “single institutional construct which many liberals have aspired to call their own, 
namely the Anglo-American legislation against discrimination”). 
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policy did not rise to a level of discrimination that would be actionable by 
white candidates passed over for judicial appointments, the white public’s 
perception that the process is discriminatory toward potential white judges 
would lead them to see the appointment process as unfair, thus violating the 
theory of procedural justice.  Under these conditions, the legitimacy of the 
courts could also be threatened. 
IV. IS THERE A JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT STRATEGY THAT CONFERS 
UNIVERSAL LEGITIMACY ON THE FEDERAL COURTS? 
I maintain that both sides of the diversity debate want the judicial ap-
pointment process to be used to achieve the same goal: preserving and en-
hancing the political legitimacy of the federal judicial system.  However, 
Republicans and Democrats are locked in a debate about how to achieve 
that goal.  Empirical evidence on the subject of diversity on the bench does 
not appear to resolve this debate with respect to minorities.219 
Pursuant to the contours of the debate as it stands now, we seem to be 
presented with two options: (1) choose the Democrats’ diversity approach, 
possibly alienating whites just as they are alienated when they believe that 
preferences are being given to minorities,220 or (2) choose the Republicans’ 
color-blind approach, maintaining the status quo pursuant to which whites 
view the courts as much more legitimate than blacks do.221  Neither of these 
strategies presumably creates a justice system that enjoys high levels of le-
gitimacy across all groups.  The status quo threatens legitimacy among mi-
norities; increasing minority presence threatens legitimacy among whites. 
This “paradox of diversity” has grave implications.  It suggests that 
universal legitimacy for the U.S. justice system may not be attainable in the 
current state of partisan politics.222  As the only unelected branch of the fed-
eral government, the federal judiciary is more reliant on its reservoir of 
good will (i.e., legitimacy) than the elected branches: “The Court lacks an 
electoral connection to provide legitimacy . . . .”223  And with the power of 
purse and sword, the elected branches are capable of enforcing compliance 
even without support of the public.  The Judicial Branch, on the other hand, 
unelected and lacking the power of purse or sword, has only its legitimacy 
 
219  See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text (describing the conflicting studies). 
220  See Scherer & Curry, supra note 21, at 101.  I must caution the reader about these findings; be-
cause the authors used a population of convenience to conduct their experiments, their findings are not 
generalizable to the population writ large. 
221  James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Blacks and the United States Supreme Court: Models 
of Diffuse Support, 54 J. POL. 1120, 1140 (1992); Scherer and Curry, supra note 21, at 97. 
222  No appointment strategy will ever have the approval of everyone in a nation as diverse as ours.  
So I use the term “universal” to mean that which cuts across racial, ethnic, and gender lines.  As for cut-
ting across partisan polarization, there is evidence that legitimacy for the courts does not divide along 
party lines.  See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 201, at 643 (finding no relationship between partisanship 
and diffuse support for the Supreme Court). 
223  Id. at 635. 
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to ensure voluntary compliance with its orders.224  Without universal legiti-
macy for the courts, the rule of law is jeopardized.  The diversity paradox 
thus threatens the ability of the courts to carry out their mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
We may have reached a critical impasse as to which of the parties’ 
judicial appointment strategies is better for the long-term stability of our 
courts.  And, in this age of interparty gridlock, there seems little hope that 
one party can be persuaded to adopt the other’s selection strategy.  The time 
has come to consider abandoning current approaches and devise a new ap-
pointment strategy that may be capable of achieving universal legitimacy.  
That new strategy should focus on raising levels of legitimacy among mi-
norities while maintaining the already high levels of legitimacy among 
whites.  Under this scenario, all races could achieve comparable levels of 
legitimacy. 
Diversity must continue to play a role in a reformulated judicial selec-
tion plan.  Under current membership, we know that minorities’ levels of 
legitimacy remain much lower than whites’.  At the same time, this new 
strategy must also educate majorities about the tangible benefits they re-
ceive through diversity programs.  Diversity proponents thus far have made 
little effort to articulate clearly to whites how a diversity strategy has real-
world benefits for them.  Instead, diversity advocates tend to reference an 
amorphous public good that only theoretically flows to whites.225  Failure to 
make a case about tangible benefits may be one explanation for the decline 
in levels of legitimacy among whites as more minority judges are appointed 
to the bench.226  Absent an articulation of tangible benefits, many whites 
continue to see a diversity strategy as affording undeserved preferences to 
blacks at whites’ expense and to see whites’ historical domination of the 
judicial system fading away.227  At least in the current polarized political 
environment, providing whites’ with examples of the tangible benefits of a 
diversity program may be the best solution to resolving the diversity para-
dox.228 
 
224  See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 201, at 635; Scherer & Curry, supra note 21, at 93. 
225  For instance, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of Michigan argued that everyone benefits 
from diversity because it aids “cross-racial understanding” and the “break[ing] down [of] racial stereo-
types.”  539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
226  Cf. Scherer & Curry, supra note 21, at 101. 
227  See supra notes 173–87 and accompanying text. 
228  Also, President Obama’s empathy approach, see supra notes 110–15, does have some long-term 
promise for resolving the diversity paradox.  Based on a recent survey of Americans on the kind of Jus-
tices they want on the Supreme Court, a majority of Americans, and even a majority of Republicans, fa-
vor “empathetic” judges.  See Gibson, supra note 115.  To the extent that President Obama and others 
can convince a majority of whites that “empathy” is not a code word for “affirmative action,” then per-
haps Republican leaders will have no choice but to acquiesce to the public’s will. 
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In terms of articulating tangible benefits that whites enjoy from im-
plementing diversity initiatives, I would suggest that Democrats first focus 
on the relationship between diversity, legitimacy, and crime.  There is a 
body of empirical work finding that raising citizens’ levels of legitimacy 
towards legal authorities, including the police and the courts, makes people 
more likely to obey the law.229  This body of work also suggests legitimacy 
is more successful in achieving obedience to the law than are coercive de-
terrence measures, such as tough criminal punishments.230  Were levels of 
legitimacy raised through diversity efforts, we could see a shift in attitudes 
with an important impact on crime rates. 
In terms of criminal justice, minorities would be most affected by in-
creased legitimacy levels of the courts as long as they remain the majority 
of criminal defendants in the justice system, as they are now.231  Since di-
versifying the federal bench has the promise of raising minorities’ feelings 
of legitimacy for the courts, we may be able to induce greater faith in our 
criminal justice system among groups which are most vulnerable to becom-
ing involved with the criminal justice system (i.e., blacks and Hispanics).  
Diversity on the bench (and in all walks of life), therefore, has the potential 
to contribute to the fostering of a more stable, law-abiding society than cur-
rently exists.232 
But whites would benefit as well from this shift in attitudes toward the 
criminal justice system.  Crime remains a salient issue in this country.  The 
 
229  See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 206, at 62 (“Citizens who view legal authority as legitimate are 
generally more likely to comply with the law.”); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the 
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 
43 DUKE L.J. 703, 763–64 & tbl.2 (1994) (finding that the public’s willingness to accept Supreme Court 
authority in a controversial area of law is linked to the Court’s broader institutional legitimacy); Tyler, 
Casper & Fisher, supra note 206, at 647 (“[I]ssues of fair process play an important role in the mainten-
ance of political allegiance.”). 
230  See TYLER, supra note 206, at 57–64 & fig.5.1, tbl.5.1. 
231  For purposes of this argument, “minorities” refers to African-Americans and Hispanics, which 
are the groups statistically most likely to be charged with crime.  These two groups comprise only 28% 
of the American population, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/us.html (click on “People” then “Ethnic groups”) (last visited Aug. 19, 2011), but 
they represent 67.5% of all criminal defendants in federal court.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2009 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.4, available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2009/SBTOC09.htm.  Greater diversity and 
greater obedience to the law could also reduce recidivism rates, which remain extremely high in the 
United States.  For example,  “67.5% of all prisoners released in 1994 were rearrested within three 
years . . . .”  Reentry Trends in the U.S.: Recidivism, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/reentry/recidivism.cfm (last visited Aug. 19, 2011). 
232  This is not to suggest that the increased presence of minorities on the bench, standing alone, will 
reduce crime rates.  Resolving disparities in income and education levels across the races is critical to 
tackling the crime problem.  But greater racial diversity across our government’s institutions, I argue, 
could also be a contributing factor for inducing greater obedience to the law, yet another way to tackle 
the crime problem, and a solution much easier to carry out than reducing income and educational dispar-
ities across the races. 
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majority of Americans support a law-and-order agenda to reduce crime as 
well as a willingness to abandon civil liberties for crime prevention.233  
They mistakenly believe that the crime rate is rising,234 and they continue to 
support harsh criminal punishments like the death penalty.235  The presi-
dent’s use of a diversity strategy to raise legitimacy among minorities could 
instill greater obedience to the law among the people statistically most at 
risk to disobey it (minority men).  This, in turn, should alleviate whites’ 
concerns about the crime problem in this country—a tangible benefit for 
whites.  But implementing this appointment strategy alone is not sufficient 
to resolve the paradox of diversity.  President Obama and future presidents 
must also articulate to the white public that their diversity plans are capable 
of conferring such tangible benefits upon them, making whites and blacks 
stakeholders in the diversity strategy. 
Right now, my hypothesis about the tangible connection between 
crime and diversity on the bench remains just a theory.  Whether such 
theory has a basis in fact remains to be tested.  To this end, I urge legal and 
political scholars, advocacy groups, and politicians to take up this issue and, 
at the same time, to try to identify through empirical analysis whether addi-

















233  See, e.g., Greg M. Shaw et al., Crime, the Police, and Civil Liberties, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 
407–09 (1998) (discussing relevant surveys in which a majority of the public was found to support law-
and-order policies that would involve curtailing civil liberties in order to fight crime). 
234  See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Perceive Increased Crime in U.S., GALLUP (Oct. 14, 2009), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/123644/americans-perceive-increased-crime.aspx; Press Release, Fed. Bu-
reau of Investigation, FBI Releases 2009 Crime Statistics (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/news/
pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2009-crime-statistics (showing decreasing crime rates). 
235  See Lydia Saad, Americans Hold Firm to Support for Death Penalty, GALLUP (Nov. 17, 2008), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/111931/americans-hold-firm-support-death-penalty.aspx. 
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